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ABSTRACT 
Almost eight years after the enactment of the business rescue regime under the Companies Act 
71 of 2008, and a plethora of judgments which have probed and prodded its provisions, it is an 
opportune time to ascertain whether the business rescue regime is an effective corporate rescue 
mechanism suitable to the modern day demands of the South African economy.  
In the current economic downturn, South Africa can ill afford a repeat show of the failed 
judicial management system. It requires a modern and effective corporate rescue mechanism 
that can be utilised in appropriate circumstances as a viable alternative and not merely a 
precursor to liquidation.  
This dissertation seeks to provide a critical analysis of the effectiveness of the business rescue 
regime to ascertain its worthiness as a corporate rescue mechanism.  
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DEFINED TERMS  
    
CIPC               Companies and Intellectual Property Commission  
CIPC Report  Report by CIPC on the status of business rescue proceedings in 
South Africa as at March 2018 
Companies Bill  The first consolidated companies bill introduced into parliament 
in 1922  
DTI               Department of Trade and Industry  
Policy Paper                        Policy paper by the DTI titled ‘South African Company Law for 
the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform’ 
SCA               Supreme Court of Appeal  
Stats SA               Statistics South Africa  
1926 Act               Companies Act 46 of 1926  
1939 Amendment Act          Companies Amendment Act 23 of 1939 
1952 Amendment Act          Companies Amendment Act 46 of 1952 
1973 Act               Companies Act 61 of 1973  
2008 Act               Companies Act 71 of 2008 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1   INTRODUCTION  
The business rescue regime contained in Chapter 61 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the 
2008 Act”), sought to redevelop the landscape for financially ailing companies,2 once destined 
for the landfill of liquidated companies under the judicial management system3 of the repealed 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 (“the 1973 Act”).  
The advent of the business rescue regime in the 2008 Act, which came into effect on 1 May 
2011, introduced a long overdue system of corporate rescue in line with international standards, 
and apposite to the modern day demands of the South African economy.4 It incorporates many 
features of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code5 and the United Kingdom Enterprise Act of 
2002.6 As eloquently stated by Professor Michael Katz:7  
For the first time in South Africa companies’ legislation we have not been rooted to 
English company law. In fact the New Companies Act is not anchored in the Company 
law of any foreign jurisdiction. The New Companies Act represents the best of breed, 
borrowing in each particular concept from the best in the particular jurisdiction. In 
certain respects we have home-grown innovations. All of this combines to enable South 
Africa to take its place amongst the best of company law jurisdictions. 
Having replaced judicial management, which was largely considered “an abject failure”8, 
business rescue seeks to protect a wider range of interests through the process,9 and give effect 
to the purpose10 of the 2008 Act, in particular, section 7(k)11 which aims to “provide for the 
                                                             
1  Titled: Business Rescue and Compromise with Creditors. The business rescue regime is contained in 
sections 128 – 154 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“the 2008 Act”).  
2  J Calitz and G Freebody “Is post-commencement finance proving to be the thorn in the side of business 
rescue proceedings under the 2008 Companies Act?” (2016) 49(2) De Jure 266.   
3  Judicial management was the predecessor to business rescue, contained in sections 427 – 440 of the of the 
1973 Act.  
4  F HI Cassim … et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 861. See also The Department of trade and 
Industry policy paper entitled ‘South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate 
Law Reform’ GN 1183 of 23 June 2004; GG 26493 para 4.6.2.  
5   Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as amended, codified in title 11 of the United States Code (US).  
6   Cassim (Note 4 above; 864).  
7  Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and others; 
Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd v Kyalami Events and Exhibitions (Pty) Ltd and others 2012 (3) 
SA 273 (GSJ) para 9.   
8  C Stein and G Everingham The new Companies Act Unlocked (2011) 409.  
9  R Bradstreet ‘Business rescue prove to be creditor friendly: Classen J’s analysis of the new business rescue 
procedure in Oakdene Square Properties’ (2013) 130 SALJ 44.  
10  Section 5 (1) of the 2008 Act provides that the “[a]ct must be interpreted and applied in a manner that gives 
effect to the purposes set out in section 7”.  
11  Section 7(k) of the 2008 Act. 
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efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner that balances the 
rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders”.12 
The idea is that whilst aiming to provide “a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants 
against the company or in respect of property in its possession”13, the company’s issues would 
be attended to by a business rescue practitioner14 who would develop and implement, if 
approved by creditors,15 “a plan to rescue the company by restructuring its affairs, business, 
property, debt and other liabilities and equity in a manner that maximises the likelihood of the 
company continuing its existence on a solvent basis”.16 
If the ultimate rescue of the company is not possible, the alternative objective is to render a 
better return for creditors than would otherwise result if the company were to be immediately 
liquidated.17 
 
1.2  THE SUCCESS RATE OF BUSINESS RESCUE  
In theory, business rescue was the long-awaited light at the end of the tunnel for many 
companies on the brink of liquidation, and one could reasonably expect a much higher success 
rate than was achieved under judicial management of between 15 and 20 percent.18  
However, some several years after enactment statistics seem to suggest otherwise. The 
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (“the CIPC”),19 publishes reports which 
“provide a statistical overview of the status of business rescue proceedings within South Africa 
based on applications” submitted to them.20 In terms of a report by the CIPC on the status of 
                                                             
12  Business rescue therefore attempts to ‘secure and balance the opposing interests of creditors, shareholders 
and employees’- See R Bradstreet ‘The new business rescue: will creditors sink or swim?’ (2011) 352 
SALJ 355.  
13  Section 128(b)(ii) of the 2008 Act.  
14  R Sharrock, K Van der Linde and A Smith Hockly’s Insolvency Law 9ed (2016) 275.  
15  E Levenstein ‘South Africa: Sink or Swim – Business Rescue… The Art of Treading Water?’, (7 March 
2012) available at 
http://www.mondaq.com/southafrica/x/167450/Corporate+Company+Law/Sink+Or+Swim+Business+Re
scue+The+Art+Of+Treading+Water, accessed on 14 August 2018.  
16  Section 128(b)(iii) of the 2008 Act.  
17  Ibid. This alternative objective is also shared by similar legislation in Australia, England and Canada   ̶
See M Pretorius ‘Business Rescue Status Quo Report Final Report’ (30 March 2015) Business 
Enterprises of University of Pretoria, available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west 
1.amazonaws.com/151110Business_Rescue.pdf, accessed on 14 August 2018.  
18  A Smits ‘Corporate Administration: A Proposed Model’ (1999) 32 De Jure at 86. 
19  The CIPC is established in terms of section 185 of the 2008 Act. The CIPC is the regulator of business 
rescue - See Sharrock (Note 14 above; 275).  
20  ‘Status of Business Rescue Proceedings in South Africa March 2018’, available at 
http://www.cipc.co.za/files/3915/2639/0127/Business_Rescue_Status_Report_March_2018_v1.0.pdf, 
accessed on 14 August 2018.  
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business rescue proceedings as at March 2018 (“the CIPC Report”), out of the 2867 cases for 
which business rescue proceedings were commenced from May 201121 to March 2018, 480 
proceedings were substantially implemented by way of filing a “Notice of Substantial 
Implementation of Business Rescue Plan” in terms of section 152(8)22 of the 2008 Act.23 This 
equates to a success rate of approximately 17%. At the end of December 2016, the success rate 
was approximately 16 %,24 and at the end of December 2015 approximately 14%.25 Overall the 
success rate, although gradually increasing over the years, appears to remain unsatisfactorily 
low.  
Further statistics on the status of business rescue proceedings from the CIPC Report are 
indicated in the table below.26 
Operational Business Rescue Proceedings 
Applications   
Total (1 May 2011 to March 
2018)  
Commenced  2867 
Ended  1691 
Terminated by way of filing a Notice of 
Termination (CoR125.2) 
602 
Substantially implemented by way of filing a 
Notice of Substantial Implementation 
(CoR125.3) 
480 
Ended up directly in liquidation 352 
Set aside by court order 22 
Declared a nullity  235 
 
It is evident from the above table that 352 ended up directly in liquidation, equating to 
approximately 12% of the 2876 cases for which business rescue proceedings were commenced. 
                                                             
21  The inception of the 2008 Act.  
22  Section 152(8) of the 2008 Act provides that “[w]hen the business rescue plan has been substantially 
implemented, the practitioner must file a notice of the substantial implementation of the business rescue 
plan”. 
23   CIPC (Note 20 above; 3).  
24   ‘Status of Business Rescue Proceedings in South Africa December 2016’ available at 
http://www.cipc.co.za/files/8114/9131/0792/Status_of_Business_Rescue_in_South_Africa_December_2
016_version1_0.pdf, accessed on 1 August 2018.  
25  ‘Status of Business Rescue Proceedings in South Africa December 2015’ available at    
http://www.cipc.co.za/files/3114/6133/0825/Status_of_Business_Rescue_in_South_Africa_December_2
015_version1_0.pdf, accessed on 1 August 2018.          
26  CIPC (Note 20 above; 3).  
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Furthermore, according to statistics on liquidations and insolvencies as at March 2018, released 
by Statistics South Africa,27 there was a 4.8% increase in the total number of liquidations 
recorded between March 2017 and March 2018,28 and a 9.4% increase in the first quarter of 
2018 when compared to 2017.29 
  
1.3  PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Business rescue was intended to be a vast improvement on judicial management, providing for 
the effective rescue of financially distressed companies.  
The success rate of approximately 17% of business rescue plans being implemented, appears 
to suggest that the majority of ailing companies are not achieving the ultimate objective of 
successful rehabilitation and continued existence as a going concern.30  
The question that immediately arises is whether business rescue is an effective regime, suitable 
to the modern day demands of the South African economy, that can be utilised by ailing 
companies as a viable corporate rescue mechanism and alternative to liquidation?   
 
1.4  RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY   
As stated by Binns-Ward J in the case of Koen and Another v Wedgewood Village Golf & 
Country Estate:31  
[T]he liquidation of companies more frequently than not occasions significant 
collateral damage, both economically and socially, with attendant destruction of wealth 
and livelihoods. It is obvious that it is in the public interest that the incidence of such 
                                                             
27  Statistics South Africa (“Stats SA”) is defined in section 4(1) of the Statistics Act 6 of 1996. The 
purpose of this act is:  
To provide for a Statistician-General as head of Statistics South Africa, who is responsible for the 
collection, production and dissemination of official and other statistics, including the conducting of a 
census of the population, and for co-ordination among producers of statistics; to establish a Statistics 
Council and provide for its functions; to repeal certain legislation; and to provide for connected matters. 
In terms of the explanatory note by Stats SA, Stats SA:  
[C]ollects administrative information on liquidations from Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission, Department of Trade and Industry, while information on insolvencies is gathered from 
Notices of the Master of the Supreme Court that appear in the Government Gazette.  
See ‘Statistics of liquidations and insolvencies, March 2018’ Statistics South Africa available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0043/P0043March2018.pdf.   
28  ‘Statistics of liquidations and insolvencies, March 2018’ Statistics South Africa available at 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0043/P0043March2018.pdf.   
29   Ibid.  
30  R Rajaram Success Factors for Business Rescue in South Africa (Unpublished LLD thesis, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, 2016) 13.  
31  2012 (2) SA 378 (WCC) at para 14.  
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adverse socioeconomic consequences should be avoided where reasonably possible. 
Business rescue is intended to serve that public interest by providing a remedy directed 
at avoiding the deleterious consequences of liquidations in cases in which there is a 
reasonable prospect of salvaging the business of a company in financial distress, or of 
securing a better return to creditors than would probably be achieved in an immediate 
liquidation. 
It is therefore imperative in the current economic climate that business rescue can be used as a 
viable alternative and not merely a precursor to liquidation. For it to be a viable alternative to 
liquidation the business rescue regime must, therefore, be effective to ensure that those 
companies capable of being rescued can utilise the regime to do so, hence the title of this study.  
 
1.5  RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In answering the main question of whether business rescue can be utilised as an effective 
corporate rescue mechanism the following interrelated sub-questions arise, which this study 
will also seek to answer:  
1. Why judicial management was an “abject failure”? 
2. Why there was a need for business rescue as a corporate rescue mechanism? 
3. Whether business rescue is an improvement on judicial management and a viable 
alternative to liquidation? 
4. Whether business rescue practitioners are adequately qualified and regulated? 
5. Whether the key components of the business rescue regime contribute to an effective 
corporate rescue mechanism? 
6. Whether business rescue is susceptible to abuse? 
7. Whether there are shortcomings in the business rescue regime, and if so, what can be 
done to eradicate them? 
 
1.6  LIMITATION OF RESEARCH  
In critically analysing the effectiveness of the business rescue regime as a corporate rescue 
mechanism, the analysis will be limited to the key components of business rescue, which it is 
submitted include the dual commencement and duration of business rescue proceedings, the 
moratorium on legal proceedings and the company’s property interests, post-commencement-
finance, the business rescue practitioner and the business rescue plan.  
14 
 
1.7  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The research methodology adopted by this dissertation is a desk-top research. Numerous 
sources will be utilised in critically analysing the history of corporate rescue in South Africa, 
followed by a critical analysis of the effectiveness of the business rescue regime as a corporate 
rescue mechanism. These sources will include South African and international sources, such 
as textbooks, journal articles, South African and international law reports and statues, theses, 
articles from the internet, and published reports (in the public domain). This dissertation will 
also include a limited comparative review by comparing relevant provisions of corporate rescue 
systems in foreign legal jurisdictions, particularly in the United States of America and the 
United Kingdom.  
 
1.8 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
This dissertation is structured into five chapters. All the chapters are interrelated and seek to 
give the reader a holistic view on the effectiveness of the business rescue regime as a corporate 
rescue mechanism. Following this introductory chapter as Chapter 1, this dissertation consists 
of the following further chapters:  
Chapter 2:  Judicial management and the need for law reform in corporate rescue 
This chapter provides a critical examination of the historical overview of corporate 
rescue in South Africa up to the 1973 Act. It examines judicial management under the 
1973 Act, the reasons for its failure, and the need for law reform in corporate rescue.  
Chapter 3: The inception and meaning of business rescue  
This chapter considers the process that culminated in the business rescue regime under 
Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act. It also examines the definition of ‘business rescue’ and its 
associated terminology.  
Chapter 4: The key components of the business rescue regime  
This chapter critically analyses the key components of the business rescue regime to 
ascertain its effectiveness as a corporate rescue mechanism. The key components 
include the dual commencement and duration of business rescue proceedings, the 
moratorium on legal proceedings and the company’s property interests, post-
commencement-finance, the business rescue practitioner and the business rescue plan.  
15 
 
 
Chapter 5:  Conclusion and recommendations  
This chapter concludes the dissertation with an overview of the preceding chapters and 
provides recommendations to address any possible shortcomings of the business rescue 
regime.   
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CHAPTER 2: JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT AND THE NEED FOR LAW REFORM 
IN CORPORATE RESCUE 
2.1  INTRODUCTION  
Before delving into the business rescue regime of the 2008 Act, it is imperative to understand 
the origins of corporate rescue in South Africa, the mechanism of judicial management that 
was available prior to the inception of the 2008 Act, and why there was a desperate need for 
law reform of the South African corporate rescue system.32  
This chapter will seek to provide a brief historical overview of corporate rescue in South 
African law prior to business rescue, with a critical focus on judicial management under the 
1973 Act and the reasons for its dismal failure.  
 
2.2  HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE RESCUE IN SOUTH AFRICAN 
LAW PRIOR TO THE 1973 ACT 
 2.2.1 The 1926 Companies Act  
Prior to 1926, a consolidated companies legislation was non-existent in South African Law as 
each province was governed by its own Companies Act.33 In 1922 the very first consolidated 
Companies Bill (“the Companies Bill”) had been introduced into Parliament, with the second 
reading of it taking place in 1923.34 Sections 195 to 198 of the Companies Bill authorised a 
court in certain instances, where it had been approached on application for a winding-up order, 
to order the appointment of a judicial manager.35 The Companies Bill was later passed into 
legislation as the Companies Act 46 of 1926 (“the 1926 Act”).36  
Judicial management had therefore been introduced into South African law as a corporate 
rescue mechanism for the very first time in the 1926 Act,37 at a time when the idea of corporate 
rescue was relatively unheard of in other comparable legal jurisdictions.38 In fact, the concept 
of endeavouring to rescue an insolvent company rather than liquidating it was so novel that the 
                                                             
32  R Bradstreet ‘The New Business Rescue: Will Creditors Sink or Swim?’ (2011) 128(2) SALJ 353.  
33   AH Olver Judicial Management in South Africa (Unpublished LLD thesis, University of Cape Town, 1980) 
1. 
34   Ibid. 
35  Olver (Note 33 above; 2). 
36  Ibid.  
37  Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd and Another v E Rand (Pty) Ltd and Another 2001 (1) All SA 223 
(C) 37.  
38  A Loubser ‘Judicial Management as a business rescue procedure in South African corporate law’ (2004) 
16(2) SA Merc LJ 139.  
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Minister of Justice at the time, responsible for directing the “draft legislation through 
Parliament”, had to proffer an explanation as to where the idea had originated from, and how 
it would be utilised.39 In doing so he explained that it was:40 
[D]erived from the practice in England and America under which receivers in equity 
are appointed, in the case of an important concern in regard to which there is some 
fear that it will go into liquidation; one which can pay its debts and which can be helped 
by someone officially appointed for this purpose. Powers of that kind would be used 
sparingly by the courts. To take a hypothetical case. You might have a large wool 
factory getting into difficulties and which ought to be helped, because it is an institution 
which helps the country. Then your court could intervene, when it is shown that this 
concern is solvent, and thus help it through its difficulties. I quite admit that this is a 
power that would not be used in any country very much, and has not been used much 
in England or America, but it might be used to save a concern, and it is for such sparing 
use that it has been inserted in the bill. The concerns you would like to help with this 
power are industrial concerns such as factories manufacturing articles in South Africa. 
You might be able to help a few of these concerns out of the mire at times.41 
However, as submitted by Loubser42 the explanation that judicial management was derived 
from the appointment of receivers in equity in America and England would have most likely 
left the members of the House of Assembly in the dark, as receivership and equity receivership 
had never formed and has not formed part of South African law.  
Surprisingly, the Minister’s unpretentious explanation is “the only official comments on record 
for the introduction of judicial management into…” the South African legal system.43 
Nonetheless, as submitted by Olver,44 the Minister made it “quite clear” that judicial 
management was only to be applied in limited circumstances, namely, to protect vital industry 
important to the economy. Unfortunately, this was not reflected in the 1926 Act, as there was 
                                                             
39   A Loubser ‘Tilting at Windmills? The Quest for an Effective Corporate Rescue Procedure in South African 
Law’ (2013) 25(4) SA Merc LJ 437.  
40   Olver (Note 33 above; 2).  
41  Hansard House of Assembly Debates 6 25 February 1926 col 996-7. See Olver (Note 33 above; 2-3).  
42   Loubser (Note 40 above; 438).  
43   Olver (Note 33 above; 3).  
44   Ibid.  
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no limitation as to the size or type of company which could be placed under judicial 
management.45  
In one of the first reported cases to grapple with the interpretation of judicial management 
under the 1926 Act, De Wet J in Silverman v Doornhoek Limited46 considered that the pivotal 
feature of the new section was that there was an onus on the applicant to:  
• demonstrate a reasonable probability that if the company were to be placed under 
judicial management, the company could overcome its difficulties thereby removing 
the prospects of winding-up out of the equation; and  
• satisfy the court that it was just and equitable for such an order to be granted.47 
These were therefore seen as two separate requirements.48 However, De Wet J ultimately 
adopted a conservative approach and required not only a reasonable probability but a strong 
probability, 49 as he stated: 
It seems to me that the object of the section is to obviate a company being placed in 
liquidation if there is some strong probability that by proper management or by proper 
conservation of its sources it may be able to surmount its difficulties and carry on. It is 
a special privilege given in favour of the company and it is to be authorised in very 
special circumstances.50  
The 1926 Act had nonetheless introduced a corporate rescue mechanism in the form of judicial 
management.51 A mechanism that had endured minor amendments over the years prior to the 
1973 Act, as a direct result of the economy at the time as well as several commissions of 
enquiries.52  
 
                                                             
45  A Loubser ‘Business Rescue in South Africa: A Procedure in Search of a Home?’ (2007) 40(1) CILSA at 
156.  
46  1935 (TPD) 349.  
47  Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd and Another v E Rand (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 40.  
48  Ibid.  
49  Ibid.  
50  Silverman v Doornhoek Limited supra at para 353.  
51  P Kloppers ‘Judicial Management – A Corporate Rescue Mechanism in Need of Reform’ (1999) 10 Stell 
LR at 419. At 418 Kloppers quotes the following apt definition of corporate rescue provided by Paul Omar 
in “Thoughts on the Purpose of Corporate Rescue" 1997 The Company Lawyer 127:  
Corporate rescue is now associated with what is termed the revival of companies on the brink of 
economic collapse and the salvage of economically viable units to restore production capacity, 
employment and the continued rewarding of capital and investment.. 
52   DA Burdette A Framework for Corporate Insolvency Law Reform in South Africa (unpublished LLD 
thesis, University of Pretoria, 2002) 344. 
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 2.2.2  Amendments to the 1926 Act 
The Companies Law Amendment Act 11 of 1932 had brought about some vital amendments 
of the 1926 Act, which was partly as a result of the economic depression at the time.53 One 
such vital amendment included the addition of section 196(1), which empowered a court to 
order the stay of any actions instituted against a company whilst under judicial management.54 
The amendment had, therefore, occasioned the vital introduction of the principle of a 
moratorium into judicial management.55 A moratorium on all lawsuits “prevents any further 
lawsuits being brought against the company, or any pending lawsuits being proceeded with, 
whilst the company is under judicial management”.56 
Unfortunately, in practice difficulties were encountered and one of the greatest difficulties, as 
identified by the Milin Commission in its report of 1948, was for the courts to ascertain, due 
to a lack of sufficient evidence, whether there was a reasonable probability that a company 
could overcome its difficulties if the court granted an order placing it under judicial 
management.57 A problem that had also been identified earlier by the Landsdown 
Commission58 in 1936, which suggested that in certain cases it was necessary for a preliminary 
investigation to be carried out.59 The Companies Amendment Act 23 of 1939 (“the 1939 
Amendment Act”) attempted to address this difficulty with an amendment to section 195 of 
the 1926 Act, which provided that every judicial management application had to first be 
referred to the Master of the Supreme Court for an investigation and a report.60 The amendment 
proved to be unsuccessful as the Master had inadequate means of carrying out a thorough 
investigation.61  
Although not recommended by the Lansdown Commission, the 1939 Amendment Act, 
unfortunately, substituted a new section 197(B) into the 1926 Act, which required that the costs 
of judicial management and creditors’ claims be paid according to the law of insolvency.62 The 
                                                             
53  Olver (Note 33 above; 6).  
54   Ibid. See also H Rajak and J Henning ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’ (1999) 116 SALJ 266 
55   Ibid.  
56  RC Williams Concise Corporate and Partnership Law 2ed (2003) at 311.  
57  Olver (Note 33 above; 4-5). A concern that was noted by the Lansdown Commission in 1936 – See Report 
of Company Law Commission UG 45 of 1936 at para 223.  
58  Report of Company Law Commission UG 45 of 1936. 
59  Olver (Note 33 above; 8).  
60  Ibid. See also FI Ofwono Suggested Reasons for the failure of Judicial Management as a Business Rescue 
Mechanism in South African Law (unpublished Post-Graduate Diploma in Law thesis, University of Cape 
Town, 2014) 2. 
61  Ibid.  
62  Olver (Note 33 above; 9).  
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section had, as submitted by Olver,63 placed an emphasis on the payment of creditors’ claims 
ahead of the rescuing of the company, which encouraged judicial managers to liquidate the 
company’s assets with an aim of paying creditors rather than attempting to save the company’s 
business. This meant that judicial management had transitioned into a process of winding-up 
without the involvement of the court.64 
The Millin Commission criticised section 197(B) and made certain important proposals to 
remedy the position where a judicial manager could himself elect to liquidate the company.65 
Amongst the proposals, included the prohibition of the sale of the company’s assets by the 
judicial manager without leave of the court (unless such sale was in the ordinary course of the 
company’s business), as well as requiring the judicial manager to first apply monies that 
became available to the continuation of the company’s business and to the costs of judicial 
management.66 The proposals of the Millin Commission were later embodied in the Companies 
Amendment Act 46 of 1952 (“the 1952 Amendment Act”).67   
Despite the aforesaid amendments, the conservative approach by the courts continued, which 
was clearly illustrated by Judge Trollip sitting in the Appellate Division (as it then was) in the 
case of Sammel and others v President Brand Gold Mining Company Limited68 when he said:  
Judicial management is a special or extraordinary procedure, an order for which will 
generally only be granted if the Court is satisfied that there is, inter alia, ‘a reasonable 
probability’ that under such management the company will ultimately be able to pay its 
debts.69  
Even though the dictum was obiter, it reinforced the conservative approach and cemented the 
trend.70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
63  Ibid.  
64  Ibid.  
65  Ibid.  
66  Olver (Note 33 above; 9-10). 
67  Olver (Note 33 above; 9-11). 
68  Sammel and others v President Brand Gold Mining Company Limited 1969 (3) SA 629 (AD).  
69  Sammel supra at para 633 A. See Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 45.  
70  Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 45. 
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 2.2.3  The decision to retain judicial management  
Despite the low success rate of judicial management, both the Lansdown and Milin 
Commissions expressed confidence in the system,71 with the Millin Commission finding no 
support for its abolition.72 However, the success rate did not appear to have improved after the 
1952 Amendment Act.73  
By 1961, judicial management had come under vigorous attack, as it was largely viewed as a 
clandestine liquidation procedure.74 The van Wyk de Vries Commission, which was appointed 
in 1963 and reported in 1970, was urged by the Masters of the Supreme Court to abolish judicial 
management on the basis of its low success rate, and the abuse of the system.75 The commission 
deemed it to be “extremely successful in a number of cases”76 which justified its retention, and 
that the core criticism was that too many court orders were granted in circumstances where 
judicial management was not a viable option.77  
Ultimately, the recommendations of the van Wyk de Vries Commission pertaining to judicial 
management, aimed at establishing “suitable machinery” to assist the court with a reliable 
valuation of the prospect of the company being rehabilitated.78 This ultimately led to judicial 
management being retained under sections 427 to 440 of the 1973 Act, with the basic principles 
from the 1926 Act remaining unaltered.79  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
71  H Rajak and J Henning ‘Business Rescue for South Africa’ (1999) 116 SALJ at 266. See also the Report 
of the Company Law Commission UG 35 of 1936 at para 223 and the Report of the Company Law 
Amendment Commission UG 69 of 1948 at para 262.  
72  Olver (Note 33 above; 10). 
73  Olver (Note 33 above; 11).  
74  E Levenstein An Appraisal of the New South African Business Rescue Procedure (unpublished LLD thesis, 
University of Pretoria, 2015) at 55.  
75  Main Report of the Companies Act Commission of Enquiry RP 45 1970 chapter XX p145 para 51.02. See 
also Olver (Note 33 above; 12) and Rajak and Henning (Note 71 above; 266).  
76   Loubser (Note 38 above; 139). 
77  Olver (Note 33 above; 12). See also Loubser (Note 39 above; 438). 
78  Olver (Note 33 above; 13). See also Rajak and Henning (Note 71 above;266). 
79  Olver (Note 33 above; 13).  
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2.3  JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT IN TERMS OF THE 1973 ACT  
 2.3.1  The requirements for a judicial management order  
Section 427(1) of the 1973 Act set out the requirements primarily pertaining to a provisional 
judicial management order.80 In terms of the section, the court81 may on application grant a 
judicial management order if by reasons of mismanagement or any other cause:  
• the company is unable to pay its debts or is probably unable to meet its obligations and 
has not become or is prevented from becoming a successful concern; and  
• there is a reasonable probability that if placed under judicial management, the company 
will be enabled to pay its debts or meet its obligations and become a successful concern; 
and  
• it appears just and equitable to the court.82   
The onus to prove the requirements rested on the applicant,83 which in terms of section 427(2) 
could have been any of the persons entitled to apply for a winding-up of a company under 
section 346 of the 1973 Act, which included the company itself, one or more of its creditors or 
members or jointly by any or all of them.84  
 
 2.3.2  Judicial management only applicable to a company   
The wording of section 427(1) of the 1973 Act, made it clear that only a ‘company’85 as defined 
by the 1973 Act could be placed under judicial management, and as such excluded businesses 
in any other form.  
 
                                                             
80  Loubser (Note 38 above; 141 and 143). 
81  The Supreme Court having jurisdiction over the company’s registered office or main place of business – 
See PM Meskin …  et al   Henochsberg on the Companies Act 61 of 1973 5ed 2011 (Service issue 33) 927. 
Furthermore, in terms of section 427(3) of the 1973 Act, when an application for the winding-up of a 
company was brought under such Act, and it appeared to the court that if the company were to be “placed 
in judicial management the grounds for its winding-up may be removed and that it will become a successful 
concern and that the granting of a judicial management order would be just and equitable, the Court may 
grant such an order in respect of that company”.  
82  JJ Henning ‘Judicial Management and Corporate Rescues in South Africa’ (1992) 17(1) JJS 96. See also 
Loubser (Note 38 above; 141-142).  
83  PM Meskin. … et al   Henochsberg on the Companies Act 61 of 1973 5ed (Service issue 33) 2011 at 923. 
See also Bahnemann v Fritzmore Exploration (Pty) Ltd vs 1963 (2) SA 249 (T) at 251 and Porterstraat 69 
Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v PA Venter Worcester (Pty) Ltd 2000 (4) SA 598 (C).  
84  Loubser (Note 45 above; 154).  
85  Section 1 of the 1973 Act defined a ‘company’ to mean “a company incorporated under Chapter IV of this 
Act and includes anybody which immediately prior to the commencement of this Act was a company in 
terms of any law repealed…” by the 1973 Act. 
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 2.3.3 Mismanagement or for any other cause  
The words “mismanagement or for any other cause”, as correctly submitted by Olver,86 were 
“… so all embracing in meaning that they … [were] superfluous and could … [have] been 
omitted from section 427(1) without altering its meaning in any way”. A variety of causes87 
could have brought about the situation of a company being unable to pay its debts or meet its 
obligations, not only mismanagement.88 The courts were, therefore, as submitted by Meskin89 
entitled to grant a judicial management order whatever the cause of the company’s difficulty, 
so long as the cause was identified.90 
 
2.3.4  Inability to pay its debts or meet its obligations and failure to become a 
successful concern 
Section 427(1) of the 1973 Act required that the company must have been unable to pay its 
debts. Accordingly, on the basis that section 345 of the 1973 Act was not made applicable to 
judicial management, commercial insolvency had to be proved.91 This is in sharp contrast to 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code, where no conditions are laid down for the use of the 
business rescue provisions and which allows the management of the company to utilise such 
mechanism as a “matter of right”.92 
However, if the company could pay its debts, judicial management could still be pursued on 
the alternative ground that the company was unable to perform its obligations other than the 
payment of its creditors. Meskin93 gives the example of a contractual obligation where a 
company has undertaken to manufacture and supply something to construct a building.  
Section 427(1) of the 1973 Act, further required that the company had not become or was 
prevented from becoming a successful concern, which appeared superfluous because as 
                                                             
86  Olver (Note 33 above; 47).  
87  In Lenning and another v Orenstein & Koppel SA Ltd 1940 WLD 59 a company had been placed under 
judicial management where it had been proved that the shares of the company had been held by enemy 
aliens during war and a result the company was prevented from operating effectively - See Olver (Note 33 
above; 47).  
88  Olver (Note 33 above; 47). 
89  Meskin (Note 83 above; 926). 
90  See Ex parte Onus (Edms) Bpk 1980 (4) SA 63 (O) at 66.  
91  Loubser (Note 38 above; 143). 
92  P Kloppers ‘Judicial Management Reform -Steps to Initiate a Business Rescue’ (2001) 13 SA Merc at 375. 
93  Meskin (Note 83 above; 926).  
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submitted by Loubser,94 a company that was unable to pay its debts or probably unable to meet 
its obligations was clearly not a successful concern in the first place.  
 
2.3.5 Reasonable probability that the company will be enabled to pay its debts or meet 
its obligations and become a successful concern 
Unlike the view of the court in Silverman supra, which required a strong probability that the 
company could be rescued before an order was granted, section 427(1) of the 1973 Act required 
that there be a “reasonable probability” that the company would become a successful concern.95 
The burden of proof remained onerous as a “reasonable probability” and not merely a 
possibility was required.96 The court in Noordkaap Lewendehawe Ko-operasie Bpk v 
Schreuder97 held that there was a material difference between the words ‘probable’ and 
‘possible’, and stated that in terms of legal terminology, something is less sure to happen if it 
is possible rather than probable.98  
There had also been divergent views amongst the judiciary as to whether the test to be satisfied 
upon a final order being granted was more onerous than that required when a provisional order 
was sought.99 Smalberger J, in the case of Tenowitz and another v Tenny Investments (Pty) 
Ltd,100 supported the view that more than a ‘reasonable probability’ was required on the return 
day before a court could grant a final order, reiterating the conservative approach of De Wet J 
in Silverman supra.101 The view of Smalberger J was fortunately departed from by Steyn J in 
Ex parte Onus (Edms) Beprek,102 as after reviewing the earlier cases of Kotze’ v Tulryk Bpk103 
and Ladybrand Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Segal104 he concluded that the test for a final judicial 
management order remained the same when a provisional order was sought.105   
                                                             
94  Loubser (Note 38 above; 143-144). 
95  Meskin (Note 83 above; 926). See Kotze’ v Tulryk Bpk 1977 (3) SA 118 (T) at 122.  
96  Loubser (Note 38 above; 143). 
97  1974 (3) SA 102 (A).  
98  Levenstein (Note 74 above; 57).  
99  Kloppers (Note 92 above; 361).  
100  1979 (2) SA 608 (E) at 683.  
101  Kloppers (Note 92 above; 361-362). Prior to the inception of voluntary administration, Australian courts 
had also adopted a conservative approach to the use of official management to rescue a company, as the 
Harmer Report Vol at para 52 stated “the legislative approach to corporate insolvency in Australia is most 
conservative”.  - See Burdette (Note 52 above; 347).  
102  1980 (4) SA 63 (0) at 66.  
103  Kotze’ v Tulryk Bpk supra note 97.  
104  Ladybrand Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Segal 1975 (2) SA 357.  
105  Kloppers (Note 92 above; 362). See also Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 
46. 
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It was further implied, in the requirement that there must be a ‘reasonable probability’ that the 
company would have become a successful concern, that it would be able to meet all its 
obligations and debts106 in full.107 Therefore, what had to be reasonably probable was that the 
company was viable, capable of ultimate solvency108 and that it would have become a 
successful concern within a reasonable109 time.110 The requirement of  ‘reasonable probability’ 
in relation to the full repayment of the company’s debts was, however, correctly criticised by 
Kloppers111 as being “outdated, unrealistic and often contrary to the wishes of creditors”.  
 
 2.3.6  Just and equitable 
Finally, if the court was satisfied that there was a ‘reasonable probability’ that the company 
would be able to recover, it was still required to ascertain whether it was just and equitable to 
grant a judicial management order.112  
Although, the 1973 Act did not set out any circumstances that would constitute an order being 
‘just and equitable’, our courts determined this requirement with reference to the rights and 
interests of shareholders and the creditors in all the circumstances of the case.113 This was 
explained by the court in Tenowitz114 supra that a court should take into consideration, where 
a company is unable to pay its debts, the principle that a creditor is entitled ex debito justitiae115 
to have the company placed in liquidation,116 which reinforced the view that judicial 
management could only be used in exceptional circumstances.117 Therefore, any creditor 
insisting on winding-up could only be overridden if it was proved that it was in the interests of 
all members and creditors that judicial management should be ordered.118 In the case of Marsh 
                                                             
106  Not merely some of the debts - See Millman N.O. v Swartland Huis Meubileerders (Edms) Bpk 1972 (1) 
SA 741 (C) at 744.  
107  Kloppers (Note 92 above; 362). See also Loubser (Note 39 above; 145). 
108  See Millman N.O. supra at 744.  
109  Unless it occurs within a reasonable time, “the application should fail because its grant would not be just 
and equitable in relation to creditors” - See Irvin & Johnson Ltd v Oelofse Fisheries Ltd 1954 (1) SA 231 
(E) at 237. 
110  Meskin (Note 83 above; 926). See also Porterstraat 69 Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd supra at 616.  
111  Kloppers (Note 92 above; 362). 
112  Kloppers (Note 92 above; 362). 
113  Meskin (Note 83 above; 927). See Millman NO supra at 747-748; Kotze’ supra at 122-123 and De Jager 
v Karoo Koeldranke & Roomys (Edms) Bpk 1956 (3) SA 594 (C) at 452 -453.  
114  Tenowitz supra at 683.  
115  The Oxford Dictionary of Law defines ex debito justitiae as follows: “[Latin from what is owed] Stated of 
a remedy that the court has no discretion to refuse. Thus, the applicant has the remedy as of right.” – See J 
Law and E A Martin Oxford Dictionary of Law 7ed (2013) at 216.  
116  Meskin (Note 83 above; 927). 
117  Loubser (Note 38 above; 143). 
118  Meskin (Note 83 above; 927). See also Tobacco Auctions Ltd v Aw Hamilton (Pvt) Ltd 1966 (2) SA 451 
(R) at 452-453.   
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v Plows (SA) Ltd119 the court refused an order for judicial management, which was opposed by 
an execution creditor, where there had been no unanimity amongst the creditors or the members 
as to whether judicial management or winding-up should ensue, and as such Herbstein J found 
that it was not just and equitable for the execution creditor “to be delayed in the exercise of his 
rights on speculations on future possibilities”.120 
Once all the requirements had been met, the court still had a discretion “as to whether or not to 
grant the order”.121 However, as provided by the court in Wire Industries Steel Products & 
Engineering Co (Coastal) Ltd v Surtees N.O. and Heath N.O.122 in relation to all aspect of 
judicial management the Court’s powers were those expressly assigned to it by the Act.123  
 
 2.3.7  Brief chronology of the judicial management procedure  
Once a court was satisfied that all the requirements were met, it was entitled to grant a 
provisional judicial management order with a return date not exceeding 60 days.124 The 
provisional order did not include an automatic moratorium and had to be applied for125 if the 
company were to have any chance of recovering and becoming viable again.126 
Once the court had granted a provisional judicial management order, the Master of the High 
Court appointed a provisional judicial manager.127 Once appointed, the judicial manager’s 
primary duties were to take over the management of the company, recover the company’s 
assets, and prepare a report detailing the general state of affairs of the company and their 
opinion on whether the company was capable of being successfully rescued.128  
The Master of the High Court then convened separate meetings of the creditors, the members 
and debenture-holders, if any, of the company,129 to consider the provisional judicial manager’s 
                                                             
119  1949 (1) PH E4 (C).  
120  Meskin (Note 83 above; 927). 
121  Ben-Tovim v Ben Tovim 2000 (3) SA 325 (C) at 331.  
122  Wire Industires Steel Products & Engineering Co (Coastal) Ltd v Surtees N.O. and Heath N.O. 1953 (2) 
SA 531 (AD) at 539-540.  
123  Meskin (Note 83 above; 927). 
124  Loubser (Note 45 above; 154). See section 432(1) of the 1973 Act.  
125  Loubser (Note 45 above; 154). See section 428(2) of the 1973 Act.  
126  Williams (Note 56 above; 314). 
127  Loubser (Note 45 above; 155). See section 429(b) of the 1973 Act.  
128  Loubser (Note 45 above; 155). See section 430(a) and (c) of the 1973 Act.  
129  Section 429(b)(ii) of the 1973 Act.  
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report, to determine the desirability of obtaining a final judicial management order, and if 
desirable, the person or persons to be appointed as final judicial manager or managers.130   
On the return day, the court could have granted a final judicial management order if it appeared 
that the company would have been enabled to become a successful concern and that it was just 
and equitable to do so after considering: 
• the opinions and wishes of creditors;  
• the report of the provisional judicial manager; 
• the report of the Master and the Registrar of companies; and 
• the number of creditors who did not prove their claim at the first meeting of creditors 
along with the amount and nature of their claim.131  
Alternatively, the court could discharge the provisional order or make any order it deemed 
just.132  
If the court decided to grant a final judicial management order, it was required to direct that the 
management of the company, subject to the supervision of the court, vest in the final judicial 
manager.133 However, the 1973 Act did not prescribe a time limit for judicial management, and 
could only be terminated by the court which granted the judicial management order on 
application by the judicial manager or any person having an interest in the company, if it 
appeared that the purpose of such order was fulfilled or it was no longer suitable that such order 
should remain in force.134 Furthermore, if the final judicial manager believed that the 
continuation of judicial management would not have enabled the company to become a 
successful concern, he or she was obliged to apply for the cancellation of judicial 
management.135 In those circumstances, the application would usually be accompanied with a 
plea for the simultaneous order for the winding-up of the company.136 
 
                                                             
130  Loubser (Note 45 above; 155). See section 431(2). In terms of section 431(2)(c) of the 1973 Act, in the 
case of any meeting of creditors, each creditor could prove their claim against the company. See also 
Williams (Note 56 above; 313).  
131  Williams (Note 56 above; 314). See section 432(2) of the 1973 Act.  
132  Section 432(2) of the 1973 Act.  
133  Section 432(3) of the 1973 Act.  
134  Section 440(1) of the 1973 Act.  
135  Loubser (Note 45 above; 156). See section 433(l) of the 1973 Act.  
136  Loubser (Note 45 above; 156). See also MS Blackman … et al Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) 
3 at 15-43.  
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2.4  THE FAILURE OF JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT AS A CORPORATE RESCUE 
SYSTEM  
Unfortunately, judicial management was an unsatisfactory alternative to liquidation, which 
enjoyed very limited success as a corporate rescue system.137 Apart from being described as an 
“abject failure”, in Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd and Another v E Rand (Pty) Ltd and 
Another138 Joseman J described judicial management as a system that barely worked since its 
inception in 1926.139  
The ultimate shortcomings140 of judicial management which prohibited it from becoming a 
successful and viable mechanism were attributed to the following:  
• heavy reliance on court procedures for its initiation, which meant that it required the 
costly involvement of legal practitioners from the outset.141 This costly exercise was 
counterintuitive to the aim of rescuing a financially ailing company and made it 
especially unsuitable for small and medium-sized businesses.142 Whereas, voluntary 
administration in Australia was simply commenced by the decision of the relevant 
party;143 
• the requirement that there be a ‘reasonable probability’ that the company would become 
a successful concern, was an onerous requirement as explained in paragraph 2.3.5 
above, and one that was often too difficult to discharge.144 Burdette145 submits that the 
requirement should have been one of ‘reasonable possibility’ or ‘reasonable prospect’ 
as opposed to ‘reasonable probability’; 
• there was a traditional practice to appoint liquidators as judicial managers of companies, 
whose function as a liquidator was to cease the trading of a business and sell its assets 
off as quick as possible, and who therefore had no experience in rescuing a financially 
ailing company.146 Furthermore, despite the importance of their role, there were no 
statutory regulations prescribing the minimum qualifications and experience of judicial 
                                                             
137  Levenstein (Note 74 above; 58). 
138  [2001] 1 All SA 223 (C).  
139  Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 60.  
140  See Kloppers for his opinion on the shortcomings of judicial management (Note 92 above; 370-374).  
141  Kloppers (Note 92 above; 370). 
142  Rajak and Henning (Note 71 above; 268). 
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146  Kloppers (Note 51 above; 424). See also Olver “Judicial Management: A Case for Law Reform” (1986) 
THRHR 86.  
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managers.147 Although the voluntary body of the Association of Insolvency 
Practitioners of Southern Africa had brought a measure of order to the monitoring of 
the practice area at the time, membership of such body was only voluntary, and a 
judicial manager was not required to be a member of a body with licensing and 
monitoring functions.148 Therefore, what should have been a regulated niche practice 
area reserved for persons with high business acumen and skill, was left open to abuse 
and incompetence;149 
• South Africa had a liquidation as opposed to a business rescue culture.150 There was 
considerable stigma associated with insolvency, and with insolvent debtors being 
condemned as reckless and dishonest.151 This attitude lay the foundation for the mistrust 
of a procedure that was viewed as a mechanism that allowed an insolvent company to 
avoid the payment of its debts owed to its creditors.152 As such, courts sought the need 
to protect the right of creditors to utilise liquidation to obtain payment of their claims 
from such infringement, by treating judicial management as an extraordinary 
procedure;153 
• the requirement that the company be insolvent or near insolvency (as set out in 
paragraph 2.3.4 above) before judicial management could be utilised, meant that by the 
time this requirement was satisfied the fate of most companies had already been sealed, 
and any attempt at rescuing a company was a futile exercise;154 and 
• judicial management was limited in application to companies and no other business 
structures.  
 
2.5  CONCLUSION  
 
Although South Africa had been one of the first countries to enact a formal corporate rescue 
procedure in the form of judicial management and had been somewhat of a pioneer in this 
regard,155 it proved to be a mechanism that was exceedingly revolutionary for its time and as 
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such one that was viewed with much scepticism. Unfortunately, it was this scepticism which 
compelled our courts to view it as an extraordinary procedure. Furthermore, despite judicial 
management being one of the first corporate rescue systems to be enacted globally, it was a 
system that had remained largely unchanged,156 and one that failed to keep abreast with 
international developments and standards of best practice.  
Judicial management ultimately failed as a corporate rescue system, and South Africa was in 
desperate need of a corporate rescue mechanism that was apposite to the modern day demands 
of the South African economy,157 and one that incorporated successful features of corporate 
rescue from other leading legal jurisdictions such as the USA, the UK and Australia to align 
itself with international best standards. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE INCEPTION AND MEANING OF BUSINESS RESCUE  
3.1  INTRODUCTION  
Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act, introduced an entirely new corporate rescue mechanism in the form 
of business rescue, which finally replaced the failed judicial management system.158 The 
business rescue regime whilst aligning itself with international standards on corporate rescue 
seeks to create a system of corporate rescue apposite to the modern day demands of the South 
African economy.159  
This chapter will briefly consider the drafting process that culminated in business rescue under 
Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act, which will provide some context to understanding the provisions 
that were enacted. The meaning of ‘business rescue’ will also be examined, which will reveal 
not only the objectives of business rescue but also the stages of the business rescue process.160  
 
3.2  THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUSINESS RESCUE UNDER CHAPTER 6 OF 
THE 2008 ACT   
The Department of Trade and Industry (“the DTI”) had been cognisant of the fact that there 
was a desperate need for the reform of corporate rescue in South Africa, and in 2004 published 
a policy paper titled “South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for 
Corporate Law Reform”161 (“the Policy Paper”). The Policy Paper was gazetted and published 
to obtain public comment.162 The Policy Paper had set out the DTI’s intended approach to the 
reform of South African corporate law, which emphasised an intention to develop a corporate 
rescue regime appropriate to the demands of a modern South African economy.163  
The DTI acknowledged in the Policy Paper that the provisions of judicial management had 
changed very little since its inception under the 1926 Act and that judicial management had 
been “rarely used and even more rarely led to a successful conclusion”.164 It quoted the 
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following by Rajak and Henning165 on the process by which a debtor should emerge from a 
rescue regime:  
All modern corporate-rescue regimes are united on one matter, the absence of which, 
possibly more than anything else, has helped to bring South Africa's judicial 
management to its present perceived impotence. This is the recognition that the agreed 
plan by which the future relations between the debtor and its creditors will be governed 
may well include the reduction of the debtor's overall indebtedness. To insist, as the 
South African rescue provision does, that a protective moratorium is available only 
where 'there is a reasonable probability that if [the debtor] is placed under judicial 
management, it will be enabled to pay its debts or to meet its obligations' is to ignore 
the well-nigh universal reality of creditors being prepared, for their own benefit, to 
forgive part of the debt. It is frequently the case that a creditor will benefit far more 
from having the debtor back in the marketplace than from suing the debtor into 
extinction. 
A radically new rescue provision must provide a mechanism under which a specified 
majority of creditors can approve a plan under which the debtor may emerge from 
protection and resume normal commercial dealings. 
The DTI had specifically mentioned in the Policy Paper that the aforesaid recommendation, as 
well as Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code,166 would be considered in creating a corporate 
rescue system.167 As Pointed out by Loubser,168 “Chapter 11 reorganisation had reached cult 
status” in the international corporate rescue arena, as a vast number of European countries as 
well as Singapore, Japan and the People’s Republic of China utilised Chapter 11 as a blueprint 
in either designing or redesigning their corporate rescue procedures. Anderson169 correctly 
points out, that “it is one matter to have common legislation it is another to have that legislation 
operate in the same manner given different social conditions and a different commercial 
environment”. Furthermore, although anointed as the “holy grail”, Chapter 11, ironically, was 
                                                             
165  Rajak and Henning (Note 72 above; 286). See also Levenstein (Note 74 above; 268). Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code refers to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as amended, codified in title 11 of the 
United States Code (US).  
166  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as amended, codified in title 11 of the United States Code (US). 
167  GN 1183 of GG 26493; 23/06/2004; 43. See also Stoop and Hutchinson (Note 163 above; 2-3).   
168  Loubser (Note 38 above; 439). See also Stoop and Hutchinson (Note 163 above; 3).   
169  C Anderson ‘Viewing the Proposed South African Business Rescue Provisions from an Australian 
Perspective’ 2008 (1) PELJ/PER 2.  
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not without criticism in the USA, particularly in the way it dealt with the issue of secured 
credit.170  
In addition to holding public consultations171on the guidelines, the DTI, as required to do so in 
terms of the legislative process, also “held briefing workshop sessions with the Portfolio 
Committee on Trade and Industry of the National Parliament of South Africa”.172 Having 
concluded public and stakeholder consultations the DTI updated the guidelines and in August 
2005, the process of legislative drafting had commenced.173 As indicated by Yeats,174 “[t]he 
drafting process which was adopted by the DTI to produce the Act … [was] both interesting 
and illuminating…”, as “an international reference team was appointed” which comprised of 
“experienced specialist attorneys and academics from the USA, UK and Australia”. 
Furthermore, a Canadian lawyer, Philip Knight, “a proponent of the school of plain-language 
drafting…”, was appointed as chief drafter.175 It was his brief to draft the provisions in a clear 
and simple manner, which would easily be understood by “all commercial participants”.176  
The first exposure draft was finalised in April 2006, shortly thereafter the draft Bill had been 
finalised for submission to the Minister and to Cabinet and was published for public comment 
on 12 February 2007.177 The draft Bill introduced business rescue as a corporate rescue 
mechanism under Chapter 6, which was to replace the failed judicial management system.178 
After lengthy public consultations and stakeholder engagements, the draft Bill was revised and 
finally adopted on 19 November 2009, as the Companies Bill B61D of 2008, which was later 
                                                             
170  Stoop and Hutchinson (Note 163 above; 15). Walters summarises the issue as follows:  
The narrative is now well-established and oft-repeated. Whereas in the past, firms filing for chapter 11 
would come into the bankruptcy process with at least some unencumbered assets, modern firms tend to 
have capital structures that are entirely consumed by multiple layers of secured debt. And so, according 
to the prevailing conventional wisdom, chapter 11, in the general run of cases, has become little more 
than a glorified nationwide foreclosure process through which secured creditors can exit via a quick 
section 363 sale or an outright liquidation. 
See AJ Walters ‘Statutory Erosion of Secured Creditors' Rights: Some Insights from the United Kingdom’ 
2015 (2) U. III. L. Rev. 543.  
171  “The DTI conducted public consultation sessions in all nine provinces from 24 June to 23 September 2004. 
At the same time, the department tabled the guidelines within the National Economic Development and 
Labour Council’s … Trade and Industry Chamber as required in terms of the National Economic 
Development and Labour Council Act” 25 of 1994 - See TH Mongalo ‘An Overview of Company Law 
Reform in South Africa: From the Guidelines in the Companies Act 2008’ 2010 xiii Acta Juridica xxii. 
172  TH Mongalo ‘An Overview of Company Law Reform in South Africa: From the Guidelines in the 
Companies Act 2008’ 2010 xiii Acta Juridica xxii.  
173  Mongalo (Note 172 above; xxii - xxiii). 
174      J Yeats ‘Putting Appraisal Rights into Perspective’ (2014) 2 Stell LR 329. See also Levenstein (Note 25    
above; 271).  
175       Ibid. 
176       Ibid.  
177  Levenstein (Note 74 above; 269). See also TH Mongalo (Note 172 above; xxiii - xxiv).  
178       Levenstein (Note 74 above; 270).  
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assented to by the State President on 8 April 2009.179 The 2008 Act came into effect on 1 May 
2011, in accordance with the expected date of commencement. The preamble specifically sets 
out as one of the aims of the 2008 Act “to provide for efficient rescue of financially distressed 
companies”.  
 
3.3  THE MEANING OF BUSINESS RESCUE  
Section 128(1) contains several definitions exclusive to Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act, with the 
cornerstone definition being that of ‘business rescue’180, which is further confirmed by the fact 
that section 128(1)(h)181 defines ‘rescuing the company’ as “achieving the goals set out in the 
definition of ‘business rescue’ in paragraph (b)”. In terms of Section 128(1)(b),182 ‘business 
rescue’ is defined as: 
proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is financially distressed 
by providing for— 
(i) the temporary supervision of the company183, and of the management of its 
affairs, business and property; 
(ii) a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants against the company or in 
respect of property in its possession; and 
(iii) the development and implementation, if approved, of a plan to rescue the 
company by restructuring its affairs, business, property, debt and other 
liabilities, and equity in a manner that maximises the likelihood of the company 
continuing in existence on a solvent basis or, if it is not possible for the company 
to so continue in existence, results in a better return for the company’s creditors 
or shareholders than would result from the immediate liquidation of the 
company. 
                                                             
179       Mongalo (Note 173 above; xxiv-xxv). 
180       Stein and Everingham (Note 8 above; 410). 
181       Section 128(1)(h) of the 2008 Act.  
182       Section 128(1)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
183  This refers to the situation where the board and management are temporarily substituted by the business 
rescue practitioner. However, the board is not removed and remains in place and can carry out duties and 
functions but only under the supervision of the business rescue practitioner   ̶  See Levenstein (Note 74 
above; 284).  
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It is evident from section 128(b)(iii),184 that business rescue envisages any one of two 
outcomes.185  The primary objective is that the company will return to continue in existence as 
a going concern,186 whilst the alternative, secondary objective is a better return for creditors or 
shareholders than would otherwise result if the company were to be liquidated. 187 Accordingly, 
unlike judicial management which required that the company be returned to solvency,188  either 
one of the two outcomes would be considered a successful rescue in terms of section 128(1)(b) 
of the 2008 Act.189 The alternative, secondary objective, however, is far less burdensome on 
the business rescue practitioner190 to achieve than the primary objective.191  
Our courts had not always been ad idem on whether business rescue proceedings could be 
utilised to secure a better return for creditors and shareholders where it is clear from the outset 
that the company would never be saved from immediate liquidation.192 In A G Petzetakis 
International Holdings Ltd v Petzetakis Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others 193 the court emphasised 
that in terms of section 131(4)194 of the 2008 Act, the court may grant an order commencing 
business rescue if there was a reasonable prospect of it being rescued, and therefore doubted 
whether the alternative objective could at the outset be relied upon in support of a business 
rescue application.195 However, in Southern Palace Investment 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm 
Investments 386 Ltd196 Eloff AJ, in acknowledging the alternative objective said that if the aim 
is merely to secure a better return for creditors:  
                                                             
184       Section 128(b)(iii) of the 2008 Act.  
185  E.P. Joubert ‘Reasonable possibility versus reasonable prospect: Did business rescue succeed in creating a 
better test than judicial management?’ 2013 (76) THRHR 554. See also Levenstein (Note74 above; 284). 
186  Ibid. Like the Australian equivalent (Part 5.3A of the 2001 Australian Corporations Act, as amended in 
2007), one of the aims envisaged is to return a company in financial difficulty to commercial viability, 
thereby avoiding liquidation   ̶ See Southern Palace Investment265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 
386 Ltd 2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) para 2.  
187  W.A. Joubert ‘Business Rescue and Compromise with Creditors’ (founding ed) The Law of South Africa 
vol 4(1) (2012). Levenstein refers to the secondary objective as “quasi-liquidation” as the company assets 
are sold off which will ultimately lead to the deregistration of the company - See Levenstein (Note 74 
above; 285).  
188  Stein and Everingham (Note 8 above; 410). 
189  S Conradie and C Lamprecht ‘Business rescue: How can its success be evaluated at company level?’ (2015) 
19 (3) South African Business Rescue Review 6. 
190  The business rescue practitioner is analysed para 4.6 below.   
191  Cassim (note 4 above; 864). 
192  Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and Others 
2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA) 23. See also Sharrock (Note 14 above; 276).  
193  2012 (5) SA 515 (GSJ) para 17.  
194  Section 131(4) of the 2008 Act is analysed in para 4.2.4 below.  
195  Sharrock (Note 14 above; 276).  
196  Southern Palace Investment 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd 2012 (2) SA 423 (WCC) 
para 25. See also Sharrock (Note 14 above; 276).  
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[O]ne would expect an applicant for business rescue to provide concrete factual details 
of the source, nature and extent of the resources that are likely to be available to the 
company, as well as the basis and terms on which such resources will be available. It 
is difficult to see how, without such details, a Court will be able to compare the scenario 
sketched in the application with that which would obtain in an immediate liquidation 
of the company. Mere speculative suggestions are unlikely to suffice. 
Similarly, in Kovacs Investments 571 (Pty) Ltd v Investec Bank Ltd and Another, Investec Bank 
Ltd v Aslo Holdings197 Le Grange J, also acknowledged the alternative objective, and pointed 
out that where the object is to secure a better return, “a reasoned factual basis” would have to 
be outlined, “vague and speculative averments” would not suffice. 
The issue was finally settled in the case of Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v 
Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and Others,198 where the Supreme Court of Appeal 
(“the SCA”) noted that:  
• recourse to the Australian rescue provision in the Corporations Act 50 of 2001, which 
was similar in wording to section 128(1)(b) of the 2008 Act, need not only be utilised 
to save the company from liquidation; and  
• in the case of Dallinger v Halcha Holdings (Pty) Ltd199 the Federal Court of Australia 
held that the statutory rescue machinery “should be available in a case where, although 
it is not possible for the company to continue in existence, an administration is likely 
to result in a better return for creditors than would be the case with an immediate 
winding-up”. 
 
Brand JA for the full concurring bench, went on to conclude at paragraph 26 that as he 
understood the section:  
[I]t says ‘business rescue’ means to facilitate ‘rehabilitation’, which in turn means the 
achievement of one of two goals: (a) to return the company to solvency, or (b) to provide 
a better deal for creditors and shareholders than what they would receive through 
liquidation. This construction would also coincide with the reference in s 128(1)(h) to 
                                                             
197  Kovacs Investments 571 (Pty) Ltd v Investec Bank Ltd and Another, Investec Bank Ltd v Aslo Holdings 
(25051/11, 18112/2011) [2012] ZAWCHC 110 (22 February 2012) para 19.  
198  Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) Ltd and Others 
2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA) at para 24.  
199  Dallinger v Halcha Holdings (Pty) Ltd 1995 FCA 1727 para 28.  
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the achievement of the goals (plural) set out in s 128(1)(b). It follows, as I see it, that 
the achievement of any one of the two goals referred to in s 128(1)(b) would qualify as 
‘business rescue’ … . 
It is evident from the definition of ‘business rescue’ that for the business rescue process to be 
triggered,200 that the company be ‘financially distressed’.201 In terms of section 128(1)(f) of the 
2008 Act:  
Financially distressed, in reference to a particular company at any particular time, 
means that— 
(i) it appears to be reasonably unlikely that the company will be able to pay all of its 
debts as they fall due and payable within the immediately ensuing six months; or 
(ii) it appears to be reasonably likely that the company will become insolvent within 
the immediately ensuing six months. 
 
In summary of the threshold requirement, Khan202 states “[a] company is financially distressed 
if, looking forward six months, it seems unlikely that it will be able to pay its debts when they 
fall due, or if it seems likely that the company’s liabilities will exceed its assets within the next 
six months”. The former is the liquidity or ‘commercial insolvency’ test203 also referred to as 
the ‘cash flow test’ in America,204 whilst the latter is the ‘balance sheet insolvency’ test.205  
The 2008 Act, does not define what is meant by either a ‘solvent’ or ‘insolvent company’, but 
as indicated by the SCA in Boschpoort Ondernemings (Pty) Ltd v Absa Bank Limited:206   
                                                             
200  Cassim (Note 4 above; 864).  
201  Stein and Everingham (Note 8 above; 410).  
202  L Khan ‘Business Rescues Panacea or Poison Pill’ (2010) 1(3) Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly 
20.  
203  Stein explains that it is “similar to the liquidity element of the solvency and liquidity test” found in section 
4(1)(b) of the 2008 Act, albeit that section 4(1)(b) refers to 12 months, providing more time to consider 
the financial position of a company – See Stein and Everingham (Note 8 above; 410). Section 4(1)(b) of 
the 2008 Act provides that:  
For any purpose of this Act, a company satisfies the solvency and liquidity test at a particular time if, 
considering all reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances of the company at that time— 
…  
(b) it appears that the company will be able to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course 
of business for a period of— 
(i)  12 months after the date on which the test is considered; or  
   (ii) in the case of a distribution contemplated in paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘distribution’ in                             
section 1, 12 months following that distribution. 
204  Levenstein (Note 74 above; 297). 
205       Stein and Everingham (Note 8 above; 411).  
206       2014 (2) SA 518 (SCA) at para 14, 16 and 19. See also Levenstein (Note 74 above; 303). 
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For decades our law has recognised two forms of insolvency: factual insolvency 
(where a company’s liabilities exceed its assets) and commercial insolvency (a position 
in which a company is in such a state of illiquidity that it is unable to pay its debts, 
even though its assets may exceed its liabilities). 
The legislature must have been content that prevailing judicial interpretations of 
solvency and insolvency respectively should continue to have effect.  
On the basis that either a cash-flow or balance sheet test can be applied to ascertain whether a 
company is financially distressed, business rescue is clearly intended to be utilised when a 
company displays signs of impending insolvency and not where a company is insolvent.207 In 
Merchant West Workings Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd v Advanced Technologies and 
Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd and Another208 Kgomo J said that:  
[I]t is clear that a business rescue plan cannot be invoked where a company is already 
insolvent. This is one of the aspects differentiating business rescue from judicial 
management. Proceedings can be started six months in advance when the tell-tale 
signs are starting to appear. For instance, a company that is trading profitably and is 
cash positive but does not have the wherewithal to repay a large debt which will 
become due and payable within the next six months would qualify to be classified as 
being “financially distressed”, thus being a candidate for business rescue. 
It, therefore, follows that where a company is already insolvent, it is not a candidate for 
business rescue, but rather one for liquidation proceedings.209  
In addition to ‘financially distressed’, irrespective of whether business rescue is commenced 
either by way of a company resolution or by a court order, it is required in both instances that 
there be a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company.210 The meaning of a reasonable 
prospect is discussed under paragraph 4.2.4 below. Accordingly, as Cassim211 indicates, 
although the pre-requisites to commence business rescue under each instance are slightly 
different, “in broad terms, the two prerequisites for business rescue proceedings are that the 
                                                             
207  P Delport … et al ‘Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 0f 2008’ (2016) 452. In Welman v Marcelle 
Props 193 CC and Another [2012] JOL 28714 (GSJ) Tsoka J, at para 28 stated that, “business rescue 
proceedings are not for the terminally ill … . Nor are they for the chronically ill”. 
208       (13/12406) [2013] ZAGPJHC 109 (10 May 2013) at para 8.  
209       Levenstein (Note 74 above; 302).  
210       Cassim (Note 4 above; 864-856).  
211       Cassim (Note 4 above; 865).  
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company must be financially distressed and there must be a ‘reasonable prospect’ of rescuing 
the company”.  
Remarkably, Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code212 does not require that the company be 
in financial distress, and as such “[t]here is no insolvency threshold”.213 So long as “there is a 
bona fide intention to reorganise the company”, the corporate rescue regime is available to all 
companies.214 
The business rescue regime is not limited in application to companies, in terms of item 6 of 
Schedule 3 of the 2008 Act, it is also applicable to close corporations.215 Unfortunately, that is 
as far as it extends, even though unincorporated associations or an entity such as partnerships 
or business trusts could also benefit from the regime as much as a company or close corporation 
would.216 
 
3.4  CONCLUSION  
It is evident that the DTI through the drafting process intended for the business rescue regime 
to be aligned with international standards on corporate rescue, in particular, Chapter 11 of the 
US Bankruptcy Code.217 It further signified the need for a shift to a more debtor-friendly 
procedure, and one that was far removed from the judicial management system under the 1973 
Act. Whether this transition was achieved will be ascertained in chapter 4 when the key 
components of the business rescue regime are critically analysed.  
The analysis of the cornerstone definition of ‘business rescue’ further revealed that business 
rescue can be utilised to obtain a better return for creditors and shareholders than would 
otherwise result through liquidation. The definition further sets out the three-stage approach to 
the business rescue regime, which include the temporary supervision of the company, a 
temporary moratorium on legal proceedings and the development and implementation of a 
business rescue plan.218 These form part of the key components of the business rescue regime, 
and whether there are effective enough to ensure a successful corporate rescue mechanism is 
ascertained in the next chapter. 
                                                             
212       Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as amended, codified in title 11 of the United States Code (US). 
213       Ibid.  
214  Ibid.  
215       Ibid. 
216       Ibid.  
217  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as amended, codified in title 11 of the United States Code (US). 
218       Cassim (Note 4 above; 865). 
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CHAPTER 4: THE KEY COMPONENTS OF THE BUSINESS RESCUE REGIME   
4.1  INTRODUCTION  
Having replaced the failed judicial management system, the business rescue regime seeks to 
protect a wider range of interests through the process,219 and give effect to the purpose220 of 
the 2008 Act, in particular, section 7(k)221 which aims to “provide for the efficient rescue and 
recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner that balances the rights and interests 
of all relevant stakeholders”.222 It is therefore imperative that the key components of the 
business rescue regime create a conducive environment for the rescue of companies teetering 
on the brink of liquidation.223 South Africa, in the current economic climate, simply cannot 
afford a repeat show of judicial management only this time under the heading of ‘business 
rescue’.  
This chapter seeks to critically analyse the effectiveness of the key components of the business 
rescue regime, which it is submitted include the dual commencement and duration of business 
rescue proceedings, the moratorium on legal proceedings and the company’s property interests, 
post-commencement-finance, the business rescue practitioner and the business rescue plan. In 
analysing these components, the court’s interpretation and the practicality of the associated 
provisions are considered. In addition, and where relevant, comparative comment has also been 
made on the provisions of corporate rescue regimes in foreign legal jurisdictions, particularly 
in the USA and the UK. Ultimately, upon interrogation of the aforesaid key components, one 
would be able to ascertain whether the business rescue regime has the essential elements of an 
effective corporate rescue mechanism.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
219  Bradstreet (Note 9 above; 44).  
220  Section 5 (1) of the 2008 Act provides that the “Act must be interpreted and applied in a manner that gives 
effect to the purposes set out in section 7”.  
221  Section 7(k) of the 2008 Act.  
222  Business rescue therefore attempts to ‘secure and balance the opposing interests of creditors, shareholders 
and employees’  ̶  See Bradstreet (Note 32 above; 355).  
223    E Levenstein ‘Time to amend the Business Rescue Act?’ 15 August 2016 Go Legal Industry News and 
Insight available at https://www.golegal.co.za/time-amend-business-rescue-act/,  accessed on 17 August 
2018. 
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4.2  THE PROCESSES BY WHICH BUSINESS RESCUE PROCEEDINGS MAY BE 
COMMENCED   
Business rescue proceedings may be commenced either by:  
• a resolution passed by the company’s board of directors to “voluntarily begin business 
rescue proceedings and place the company under supervision”;224 or  
• a court order,225 after an “affected person226 has brought an application to place “the 
company under supervision” 227 and commence business rescue proceedings.228 
 
4.2.1 Business rescue commenced by voluntary board resolution  
The company’s board of directors may pass a resolution by majority vote229 to “voluntarily 
begin business rescue proceedings and place the company under supervision” only if the board 
has reasonable grounds to believe that:  
• the company is financially distressed; and  
• there appears to be a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company.230  
 
The 2008 Act does not define what is meant by “reasonable grounds to believe”. Levenstein231 
submits that directors will have to consider the company’s specific circumstances at the time, 
which will include both subjective (the director’s personal view) and objective (a reasonable 
director’s view) elements. The meaning of ‘financially distressed’ was discussed under 
paragraph 3.3 above.  
 
                                                             
224  Section 129(1)(a) & (b) of the 2008 Act.  
225       Sharrock (Note 14 above; 277).  
226  In terms of section 128(1)(a) of the 2008 Act an ‘affected person’ is defined in relation to the company to 
mean, a shareholder or creditor of the company, a registered trade union representing the employees of the 
company, and employees of the company who are not represented by a registered trade union, each of 
those employees or their representatives.   
227      Section 128(1)(i) of the 2008 Act defines ‘supervision’ to mean “the oversight imposed on a company 
during its business rescue proceedings”. 
228       Section 131 of the 2008 Act.  
229  Majority vote of the board of directors or “by the majority of the board giving written consent” – See J 
Rushworth ‘A critical analysis of the Business Rescue Regime in the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ (2010) 
Acta Juridica 377. Furthermore, a board that is not properly constituted cannot take a valid board resolution 
 ̶  See Delport (Note 207 above; 459). 
230  Section 129(1)(a) & (b) of the 2008 Act.  
231  Levenstein (Note 74 above; 308). 
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In ascertaining whether a company is ‘insolvent’, Levenstein232 correctly submits “that the 
board will have to take advice from its auditors and to establish by way of formal accounting 
deliberation whether or not such company is in a position of balance sheet insolvency”. The 
meaning of ‘reasonable prospect’ is discussed under paragraph 4.2.4 below, as it is also 
pertinent to the commencement of business rescue proceedings by a court order.  
In terms of section 129(7) of the 2008 Act, if a company’s board of directors “have reasonable 
grounds to believe that the company is financially distressed”, but have not adopted a resolution 
to commence business rescue proceedings, the board is required to give written notice to each 
‘affected person’, setting out the relevant criteria of financial distress applicable to the 
company,233 and its reasons for not adopting the resolution to voluntary commence business 
rescue proceedings.234 This, therefore allows an ‘affected person’ to apply to court to 
commence business rescue proceedings,235 and also puts into effect the necessary ‘checks and 
balances’.  
The rationale for introducing voluntary commencement of business rescue by a company’s 
board of directors is that the board is best suited to ascertain whether the company is indeed 
financially distressed.236 As stated by Gutta J in Lazenby v Lazenby Vervoer VV and Others237 
“[a] board of a company bears knowledge that a company is financially distressed and is best 
equipped to pass a resolution that a company be placed under business rescue and to initiate 
the business rescue proceedings… .” 
Voluntary commencement circumvents the delays and exorbitant costs associated with the 
court process238 and ensures that the company receives the assistance of the business rescue 
mechanism as soon as possible, thereby increasing the prospects of the company being 
rescued.239 This self-regulating approach clearly signifies a shift towards a more debtor-
friendly procedure, however, it has been criticised for being “too debtor-friendly”  and creating 
too low a threshold for the commencement of business rescue, making the process susceptible 
                                                             
232       Levenstein (Note 74 above; 303).  
233  Sharrock (Note 14 above; 278). 
234  Rushworth (Note 229 above; 379).  
235  Ibid.  
236  Delport (Note 207 above; 458). 
237  Lazenby v Lazenby Vervoer VV and Others (M328/2014) [2014] ZANWHC 41 (4 September 2014) para 
23.  
238  Cassim (Note 4 above; 866). 
239  Delport (Note 207 above; 458). 
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to abuse.240 The passing of the resolution is, however, subject to the common law and 
statutory241 fiduciary duties of the directors, which if contravened may result in personal 
liability for those directors in terms of section 77 of the 2008 Act.242 It is submitted that the  
severe consequences for directors breaching their fiduciary duties should curb the abuse of the 
voluntary process to a certain extent.  
Like the Australian243 procedure, the company’s shareholders may not resolve to voluntarily 
place the company under business rescue.244 Furthermore, shareholders’ approval is not 
required, and as such directors are not required to consult shareholders.245 Therefore, the wishes 
of the shareholders should not be a determining factor.246 Although, as pointed out by the court 
in Griessel and Another v Lizemore and Others247 a board’s decision which is contrary to the 
wishes of the shareholders would signify mala fides.248 
Restrictions are imposed on the passing of the resolution to commence business rescue 
proceedings.249 Firstly in terms of section 129(2)(a) of the 2008 Act the resolution “may not be 
adopted if liquidation proceedings have been initiated by or against the company”, which 
follows the UK Insolvency Act.250 Secondly in terms of section 129(2)(b)251 the resolution to 
commence business rescue proceedings will have no force and effect until such time that it is 
filed with the CIPC.  
In addition, there are a few stringent time limits enforced by the 2008 Act on filing, publication 
and the appointment of a business rescue practitioner once the board has passed the resolution, 
which further reduces delays and the abuse of the process.252 Within five business days of the 
                                                             
240  Stein and Everingham (Note 8 above; 412). The low threshold is further reinforced by the fact that at the 
time of passing the resolution no supporting documentation is required to be filed or published, nor is it 
necessary to apply to court – See Cassim (Note 4 above; 866) and Stein and Everingham (Note 8 above; 
412).  
241  See section 76 of the 2008 Act – ‘Standards of directors conduct’. Directors should seek professional 
advice to exclude the possibility of being found personally liable for breaching their fiduciary duties – See 
Stein and Everingham (Note 8 above; 412).  
242  Delport (Note 207 above; 459).  
243  See section 436 A (1) Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act 50 of 2001 (Cth).  
244  Cassim (Note 4 above; 866). 
245  Cassim (Note 4 above; 866). 
246  Delport (Note 207 above; 459) 
247  Griessel and Another v Lizemore and Others 2015 (4) All SA 433 (GJ) para 140.  
248  Delport (Note 207 above; 459). 
249  Cassim (Note 4 above; 867). 
250  Cassim (Note 4 above; 867). Schedule B1 para 25 (a) of the UK Insolvency Act of 1986 provides that an 
“administrator of a company may not be appointed if—a petition for the winding up of the company has 
been presented and is not yet disposed of”.  
251       Section 129(2)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
252  Cassim (Note 4 above; 867). 
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board passing the resolution, or such extended time permitted by the CIPC on application the 
company must:  
• publish a notice of the resolution, and its effective date, in the prescribed manner to 
every affected person, including with the notice a sworn statement of the facts relevant 
to the grounds on which the board resolution was founded;253 and 
• appoint a business rescue practitioner who satisfies the requirements of section 
138,254and who has consented in writing to accept the appointment.255 
 
Within two business days after appointing the business rescue practitioner, the company is 
required to file a notice of appointment, and within five business days of after filing the notice, 
to publish a copy of the notice to each ‘affected person’.256 
The publication requirements seek to ensure that directors discharge their fiduciary duties when 
contemplating passing a resolution to commence business rescue proceedings.257                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
Understandably, criticism has been levelled at the board’s far-reaching power to appoint a 
business rescue practitioner, as the board may be the very cause of the financial distress the 
company finds itself in, which could lead to greater abuse of the process.258 Stein259 correctly 
submits that the board’s appointment of the business rescue practitioner should ideally include 
some form of independent approval, which is addressed to a certain extent by the 2008 Act and 
its regulations. The pivotal role of the business rescue practitioner is analysed in paragraph 4.6 
below.  
Should a company fail to either appoint a business rescue practitioner or comply with the 
requirements for the publication and filing of notices, in terms of section 129(5)(a) of the 2008 
Act the resolution to commence business rescue proceedings lapses and becomes a nullity.260 
Only three months after the date on which the lapsed resolution was adopted, may the board 
                                                             
253  Section 129(3)(a) of the 2008 Act. See Regulations 123 (1) - (5) of the 2008 Act which sets out the 
“[n]otices to be issued by a company concerning its business rescue proceedings” as well as the relevant 
CoR forms.  
254  The requirements of section 138 of the 2008 Act is discussed under para 4.6 below.  
255  Section 129(3)(b) of the 2008 Act. 
256  Section 129(4)(a) – (b) of the 2008 Act.  
257  Stein and Everingham (Note 8 above 413).  
258  Ibid. 
259  Ibid. 
260  Sharrock (Note 14 above; 277).  
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file another resolution to commence business rescue proceedings, unless the court on good 
cause shown approves the filing of a further resolution.261 
 
4.2.2 The effect of non-compliance with the procedural requirements of section 129 
of the 2008 Act  
It is clear that the 2008 Act sets out stringent procedural time constraints associated with the 
voluntary commencement of business rescue proceedings.262 There have, however, been 
conflicting judgments as to whether non-compliance with the procedural requirements of 
section 129263 (as set out above), results in business rescue proceedings being terminated.264 In 
Advanced Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) v 
Aeronautique et Technologies Embarquées SAS & Others265 Fabricius J concluded that:  
It is clear from the relevant sections contained in chapter 6 that a substantial degree of 
urgency is envisaged once a company has decided to adopt the resolution beginning 
rescue proceedings. The purpose of s 129(5) is very plain and blunt. There can be no 
argument that substantial compliance can ever be sufficient in the given context. If there 
is non-compliance with s 129(3) or (4) the relevant resolution lapses and is a nullity. 
There is no other way out, and no question of any condonation or argument pertaining 
to ''substantial compliance”. The requirements contained in the relevant sub-sections 
were either complied with or they were not. 
Although not expressly stated, the learned judge appeared to have adopted the view that the 
inevitable consequence of the lapsed resolution was that the business rescue process would 
terminate.266 This approach was followed in several other cases.267 However, in Absa Bank 
                                                             
261  Section 129(5)(b) of the 2008 Act. 
262  B Wassman ‘Business Rescue: Getting it Right’ (January/February 2014) De Rebus 37.  
263  Section 129 of the 2008 Act.  
264  A Eliott and K Weyers ‘Hot off the business rescue press’ July 2015 available at                
https://www.hoganlovells.com/en/pdfdownload?page=%7b3570E51C-86E8-4C73-BD6A-
7A5E1A08077D%7d&p=1 accessed on 24 August 2018. 
265  Advanced Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) v Aeronautique et 
Technologies Embarquées SAS & Others Unreported, GNP (Case 72522/11, 6 June 2012) para 26. 
266  Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Nel N.O. and Others 2015 (5) SA 63 (SCA) para 17. 
267  Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra para 18. See the following cases that followed the 
approach in Advanced Technologies and Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) supra: 
Madodza (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) v ABSA Bank Ltd [2012] ZAGPPHC 165 at para 24-25; Homez 
Trailers and Bodies (Pty) Ltd (under supervision) v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd [2013] ZAGPPHC 
465 at para 16 & 20; Absa Bank Ltd v Ikageng Construction (Pty) Ltd; In Re: Absa Bank Ltd v Contrau 
Projects CC, In Re; Absa Bank Ltd v Wermar Konstruksie CC [2014] ZAGPPHC 684 at para 11.  
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Limited v Caine N.O. and Another, In Re; Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another,268 
Daffue J correctly pointed out that Fabricius J had failed to give consideration to section 
130(1)(a)(iii),269 as he chose to rely on the “plain and unambiguous wording” of sections 129(3) 
and (4) of the 2008 Act, and as such his construction led to anomalies as between sections 129 
and 130 of the 2008 Act.270 
The SCA in Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another v Nel N.O. and Others271 identified the 
observation made by Daffue J as “undoubtedly correct”272 and went on to definitively settle the 
contentious issue. The facts of the case were as follows:  
• the sole shareholders of Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd (“Panamo”) was the Jan Nel Trust 
(“the Trust”), whose trustees were Mr and Mrs Nel (“the Nels”), who were also the 
directors of Panamo. Panamo as a property-owning company owned a large property 
(“the Panamo Property”), which was mortgaged in favour of Firstrand Bank Ltd; 
• the Nels’ house was situated on a portion of the Panamo Property; 
• Panamo fell into arrears, and in addition to monetary judgment being obtained against 
it, the hypothecated Panamo Property was declared executable; 
• to avoid the sale of the Panamo Property the Nels resolved to place Panamo in business 
rescue on 19 August 2011. Thereafter a business rescue practitioner was appointed, and 
a business rescue plan was approved. The Panamo Property was later sold by the 
business rescue practitioner as a result of insufficient funding; and  
• when the transfer of the Panamo Property was due to take place, the Trust sought an 
order on an urgent basis that the resolution to place Panamo in business rescue had 
lapsed as a result of its failure to comply with the various procedural requirements set 
out in section 129 of the 2008 Act, and such the entire business rescue process was a 
nullity.273  
 
                                                             
268  Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another, In Re; Absa Bank Limited v Caine N.O. and Another [2014] 
ZAFSHC 46 at 25. 
269  Section 130(1)(a)(iii) of the 2008 Act provides that an effected person may apply to court for an order 
setting aside the resolution on the ground that “the company has failed to satisfy the procedural 
requirements set out in section 129”.  
270  Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 18. 
271  Ibid. 
272  Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 19. 
273  Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 2 - 4. See also Elliot and Weyers (Note 263 above). 
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In the court a quo274 Khumalo J, despite finding the approach of the Trust as opportunistic and 
that the Nels had acted to Panamo’s detriment,275 upheld the Trust’s argument and issued a 
declaratory order that the resolution to commence business rescue had lapsed and was a nullity, 
and further ordered that appointment of the business rescue practitioner to Panamo was void.276 
The learned judge, therefore, adopted the approach of Fabricius J in Advanced Technologies 
and Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) supra, that upon the lapsing and 
nullity of the resolution, business rescue proceedings simultaneously terminated. Khumalo J 
did, however, grant leave to appeal.  
On appeal to the SCA, the issue was whether the approach adopted by Khumalo J was 
correct.277 The SCA indicated that the approach of Fabricius J (which was also the approach 
adopted by the court a quo) appeared to leave no room for the operation of section 
130(1)(a)(iii),278 as “[t]here is no point in bringing an application to set aside a resolution on 
the grounds of non-compliance with the procedural requirements of s 129 if that resolution has 
already lapsed and been rendered a nullity and the process of business rescue has as a result, 
come to an end”.279 The SCA further highlighted the provision of section 132 (2)(a)(i) of the 
2008 Act, which provides that business rescue proceedings end when the court sets aside the 
resolution or order that began those proceedings.280 The SCA ultimately held that:  
[W]hen a court grants an order in terms of s 130(5)(a) of the Act, the effect of that order 
is not merely to set the resolution aside, but to terminate the business rescue 
proceedings.  …  it follows that until that has occurred, even if the business rescue 
resolution has lapsed and become a nullity in terms of s 129(5)(a), the business rescue 
commenced by that resolution has not terminated. Business rescue will only be 
terminated when the court sets the resolution aside. The assumption underpinning the 
various high court judgments to the effect that the lapsing of the resolution terminates 
the business rescue process is inconsistent with the specific provisions of the Act. None 
of those judgments referred to s 132(2)(a)(i). 
                                                             
274  Nel NO and Another v Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others [2013] ZAGPPHC 287.  
275  The court even went as far as ordering the applicants (the Nels in the representative capacity as trustees of 
the Trust) to pay the costs of the application for the declaratory order de bonis propiis, (in their personal 
capacity) jointly and severally  ̶  See Nel NO and Another supra para 38.4.  
276  Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 4.  
277  Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 5. 
278       Section 130(1)(a)(iii) of the 2008 Act.  
279       Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 20. 
280  Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 28.  
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Once it is appreciated that the fact that non-compliance with the procedural 
requirements of s 129(3) and (4) might cause the resolution to lapse and become a 
nullity, but does not terminate the business rescue, the legislative scheme of these 
sections becomes clear.281 
The SCA therefore, thankfully clarified the position, and in doing so upheld the appeal with 
costs, and set aside and replaced the order of the court a quo with an order dismissing the 
application of the Trust.  
 
4.2.3 Objection to voluntary commencement of business rescue  
 
In order to curb any potential abuse of the voluntary commencement aspect of the business 
rescue regime, the legislator wisely made provision for ‘affected persons’ to approach a court 
in appropriate circumstances to set aside the resolution.282  
 
In terms of Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act, a ‘court’ means “the High Court that has jurisdiction 
over the matter”283, or a judge of the High Court that has jurisdiction over the matter and that 
has been designated284 by the Judge President,285 or where no judge has been designated, a 
judge of the High Court that has jurisdiction over the matter and who has been assigned by the 
Judge President to hear the matter.286 
In terms of section 130(1),287 any time after the adoption of a resolution by the board to 
commence business rescue and until such time that the business rescue plan is adopted,288 an 
‘affected person’ may apply to court to set aside the resolution on any one of the following 
grounds:  
• “there is no reasonable basis for believing that the company is financially distressed”.289 
Information pertaining to whether a company is financially distressed may not be easily  
available to prospective applicants, and as such this may be difficult to prove;290 or 
                                                             
281  Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 28-29.  
282  Delport (Note 207 above; 477-478).  
283       Section 128(e)(i) of the 2008 Act.  
284        In terms of section 128(3) of the 2008 Act, “the Judge President of a High Court may designate any judge 
of that court generally as a specialist to determine issues relating to commercial matters, commercial 
insolvencies and business rescue”. See also Rushworth (Note 229 above; 376-377).  
285       Section 128(e)(aa) of the 2008 Act.  
286       Section 128(e)(bb) of the 2008 Act.  
287  Section 130(1) of the 2008 Act.  
288  The adoption of business rescue plan is discussed under paragraph 4.7 below.  
289  Section 130(1)(a)(i) of the 2008 Act.  
290  Stein and Everingham (Note 8 above; 326).  
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• “there is no reasonable prospect for rescuing the company”.291 The 2008 Act, 
unfortunately, does not define what is meant by ‘reasonable prospect’, and its meaning 
is analysed in more detail under paragraph 4.2.4 below; or  
• “the company has failed to satisfy the procedural requirements” as provided for in 
section 129.292The procedural requirements and the effect of non-compliance are 
discussed in paragraphs 4.2.1 to 4.2.2 above.   
 
On considering the application to set aside the resolution, in terms of section 130(5)(a),293 the 
court may set aside the resolution on any of the three aforesaid grounds,294 “or … if, having 
regard to all of the evidence, the court considers that it is otherwise just and equitable to do 
so”.295  
In considering section 130(5)(a),296 the court in DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz 
N.O. and Others,297 noted that a court is entitled to grant relief “on a cause of action which 
cannot be relied upon by the applicant” i.e. on the basis that it is ‘just and equitable’ for the 
resolution to be set aside, and as such gives rise to an anomaly. In dealing with the anomaly, 
which the court identified as a “drafting error”298, the court highlighted the dictum of Wallis 
JA in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality299 that “[a] sensible 
meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or 
undermines the apparent purpose of the document”. The court then concluded that: 
The only sensible meaning which avoids the absurdity which would otherwise result is 
to construe the just and equitable basis as an additional ground to the three listed in s 
130(1)(a). This can therefore be relied on as a fourth ground or cause of action for 
relief in an application brought under that section.300 
                                                             
291  Section 130(1)(a)(ii) of the 2008 Act.  
292  Section 128 of the 2008 Act.  
293       Section 130(5)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
294       Section 130(5)(a)(i) of the 2008 Act.  
295       Section 130(5)(a)(ii) of the 2008 Act.  
296       Section 130(5) of the 2008 Act.  
297  DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gribnitz NO and Others 2014 (1) SA 103 (KZP) para 18. See also 
Delport (Note 207 above; 478 - 479). 
298  DH Brothers Industries (Pty) Ltd supra at para 18.  
299  Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at para 18.  
300  Ibid.  
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The SCA in Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra rejected such approach.301 Wallis 
JA for the full concurring bench indicated that:  
This appears to me to be yet another case in a long line, commencing with Barlin,302 in 
which the legislation uses the disjunctive word ‘or’, where the provisions are to be read 
conjunctively and the word ‘and’ would have been more appropriate. Where to give the 
word ‘or’ a disjunctive meaning would lead to inconsistency between the two 
subsections it is appropriate to read it conjunctively as if it were ‘and’. This has the 
effect of reconciling s 130(1)(a) and s 130(5)(a) and limiting the grounds upon which 
an application to set aside a resolution can be brought, whilst conferring on the court 
in all instances a discretion, to be exercised on the grounds of justice and equity in the 
light of all the evidence, as to whether the resolution should be set aside.303 
Insofar as it may be suggested that the use of the word ‘otherwise’ in s 130(5)(a)(ii) 
points in favour of this furnishing a separate substantive ground for setting aside the 
resolution I do not agree. In my view the word is used in this context to convey that, 
over and above establishing one or more of the grounds set out in s 130(1)(a), the court 
needs to be satisfied that in the light of all the facts it is just and equitable to set the 
resolution aside and terminate the business rescue.304 
Accordingly, “otherwise just and equitable to do so”305 must not be understood as an additional 
ground for setting aside a resolution, but as a further requirement that needs to be satisfied 
along with one or more of the three grounds relied upon by an ‘affected person’ in terms of 
section 130(1)(a),306 for the resolution to be set aside.307  
                                                             
301       Delport (Note 207 above; 479).   
302       Barlin v Licencing Court for the Cape 1924 AD 427 at 478.  
303       Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 31. 
304       Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra at para 32. The court further indicated at para 34 that a: 
[F]urther point in favour of this approach is that it largely precludes litigants, whether shareholders and 
directors of the company or creditors, from exploiting technical issues in order to subvert the business 
rescue process or turn it to their own advantage. Once it is recognised that the resolution may be set 
aside and the business rescue terminated if that is just and equitable, the scope for raising technical 
grounds to avoid business rescue will be markedly restricted even if it does not vanish altogether. That 
result is consistent with the injunction in s 5 of the Act that its provisions be interpreted in such a manner 
as to give effect to the purposes set out in s 7, one of which, as I said at the outset, is to provide for the 
efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies in a manner that balances the rights 
and interests of all relevant stakeholders.  
305       Section 130(5)(a)(ii) of the 2008 Act.  
306       Section 130(1)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
307       Alderbaran (Pty) Ltd and Another v Bouwer and Others 2018 (5) SA 215 (WCC) at 39. See also          
Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another at para 32.  
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Alternatively, in considering the application the court may first afford the practitioner an 
opportunity to formulate an opinion on whether “the company appears to be financially 
distressed”, or “there is a reasonable prospect of rescuing the company”.308 After the court 
receives the practitioner’s report it may then set aside the resolution if it is satisfied “that the 
company is not financially distressed” or “there is no reasonable prospect of rescuing the 
company”.309  
If the court makes an order setting aside the company’s resolution, the court may grant any 
further and necessary order including:  
• “placing the company under liquidation”.310 In BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
Intertrans Oil SA (Pty) Ltd and Others311 the court not only set aside the company’s 
resolution placing it in business rescue, it further made an order placing the company 
under provisional liquidation as the court was of the view that the company’s lack of 
operating capital and business premises together with a considerable outstanding debt 
would ultimately cause business rescue to fail.312 It is important to note that in terms of 
section 140(4)313 if the business rescue ends with the company being placed in 
liquidation, the business rescue practitioner is excluded from being appointed as the 
liquidator of the company; or  
• if the court finds “that there were no reasonable grounds for believing that the company 
would be unlikely to pay all of its debts as they became due and payable”, the court 
may grant a cost order against any director who voted in favour of the resolution, unless 
the court finds that the director acted in good faith and on the basis of relying on 
information in terms of section 76(4) and (5) of the 2008 Act. Directors should, 
therefore, be circumspect when voting in favour of a resolution to commence business 
rescue proceedings.314  
 
                                                             
308  Section 130(5)(b)(i) and (ii) of the 2008 Act.  
309  Section 130(5)(b). 
310  Section 130(5)(c)(i) of the 2008 Act.  
311  BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Intertrans Oil SA (Pty) Ltd and Others 2017 (4) SA 592 (GJ) at para 72-
76.  
312  Delport (Note 207 above; 480).  
313       Section 140(4) of the 2008 Act.  
314     Levenstein (Note 74 above; 326). In terms of section 130(2) of the 2008 Act, a director that supported                                    
a resolution to commence business rescue, and who is also an ‘affected person’, may not apply to court to 
set aside the resolution of the appointment of the practitioner, unless such director can satisfy the court that 
he or she acted in good in faith on strength of information that was subsequently found to be false or 
misleading.  
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Under section 130(1),315 an ‘affected person’ is also entitled to apply to court to set aside the 
appointment of a practitioner on any one of the following grounds:  
• the practitioner does not satisfy the requirement of section 138 of the 2008 Act,316 these 
requirements are discussed under paragraph 4.6 below; or 
• the practitioner is not independent of the company or its management.317 This ground 
appears to be superfluous as if it is found to be the case, this would already be covered 
by the previous ground i.e. the practitioner’s failure to comply with section 138 of the 
2008 Act;318 or 
• the practitioner lacks the necessary skills, given the company’s circumstances.319 This 
would likely be the case where the supervision is very complicated or industry-specific 
i.e. mining.320 
 
If the court sets aside the appointment of the practitioner, it is required to appoint an alternative 
practitioner, who satisfies the requirements of section 138,321 and who is “recommended by, or 
acceptable to, the holders of majority of the independent creditors’ voting interests who were 
represented in the hearing before the court”.322 
An ‘affected person’ is further entitled in terms of section 130(1)(c)323 to apply to court to 
require “the practitioner to provide security in an amount and on terms and conditions that the 
court considers necessary to secure the interests of the company and any affected persons”.  
The King III practice notes on the ‘Guidance on Business Rescue’324, noted that:  
Although the form of security is not mentioned in the legislation, it is accepted that the 
bond of security will be the same as the ones currently provided by liquidators and 
trustees to the Master of the High Court in liquidations and sequestrations, consisting 
                                                             
315  Section 130(1) of the 2008 Act. 
316  Section 130(1)(b)(i) of the 2008 Act.  
317  Section 130(1)(b)(ii) of the 2008 Act.  
318  Delport (Note 207 above; 474).  
319        Section 130(b)(iii) of the 2008 Act. Similar to voluntary commencement of business rescue, where business 
rescue is commenced by court order (compulsory commencement) “[e]very affected person has the right 
to participate in the hearing of an application in terms of … .”  ̶  See section 131(3) of the 2008 Act.  
320       Delport (Note 207 above; 474).  
321       Section 138 of the 2008 Act.  
322       Section 130 (6)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
323       Section 130(c) of the 2008 Act.  
324        Institute of Directors in Southern Africa King III Chapter 2 Guidance on Business Rescue (Practice Notes), 
September 2009 available at https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/collection/24CB4885-
33FA-4D34-BB84-E559E336FF4E/KingIII_Ch2_Guidance_on_Business_Rescue_September2009.pdf, 
accessed on 15 August 2018.  
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of an undertaking by the practitioner and guaranteed by an acceptable short-term 
insurance provider. 
Interestingly, the practitioner cannot be compelled to furnish security where business rescue is 
commenced by a court order.325  
 
4.2.4 Business rescue commenced by court order  
On condition that a resolution to commence business rescue has not been adopted by a 
company, in terms of section 131(1) of the 2008 Act, an ‘affected person’ is entitled on 
application to approach “a court at any time for an order placing the company under supervision 
and to commence business rescue proceedings”.326 Therefore, a shareholder or creditor of the 
company, an individual employee of the company or a registered trade union representing the 
company’s employees may bring an application to place the company under business rescue.327 
The applicant is required to serve the application on the company and the CIPC, and “notify328 
each affected person of the application in the prescribed manner”.329 Every ‘affected person’ is 
entitled to participate in the hearing of the application. 330 A differentiating and crucial factor 
of business rescue being commenced by a court order as opposed to voluntary commencement 
by a company resolution, is that an application in terms of section 131331 may be made even if 
liquidation proceedings have already commenced.332  
In terms of section 131(6)333 if an application is brought subsequent to liquidation proceedings 
having already been commenced by or against the company, such application will have the 
effect of suspending the liquidation proceedings until such time that the court has dismissed 
the business rescue application, or where the court grants the order, until business rescue 
                                                             
325       Cassim (Note 4 above; 871).  
326       Section 131(1) of the 2008 Act.  
327       Delport (Note 207 above;482).  
328     Regulation 124 of the 2008 Act requires that the applicant “deliver a copy of the court application, in 
accordance with regulation 7, to each effected person known to the applicant”.  
329       Section 131(2)(a) and (b) of the 2008 Act.  
330       Section 131(3) of the 2008 Act. In the case of Cape Point Vineyards (Pty) Ltd v Pinnacle Point Group Ltd 
and Others 2011 (5) SA 600 WCC at para 21 Rogers AJ stated that:  
In terms of s 131(3) each affected person has a right to participate in the hearing of an application in 
terms of s 131. In the circumstances, I do not think the legislature contemplated that an affected party 
would have to apply for leave to intervene in the proceedings. If the person is an "affected person" such 
person has a right to participate in the hearing. If the person wishes to file affidavits, the court will 
obviously need to regulate the procedure to be followed to ensure fairness to all concerned. 
            See also Levenstein (Note 74 above; 335-336).  
331       Section 131 of the 2008 Act.  
332       Sharrock (Note 14 above; 279).  
333       Section 131(6) of the 2008 Act.  
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proceedings terminate.334 This reinforces the fact that business rescue aims at “preserving 
viable commercial enterprises rather than shutting them down by liquidation”335, thereby 
“avoiding the deleterious consequences of liquidations in cases in which there is a reasonable 
prospect of salvaging the business of a company in financial distress, or of securing a better 
return to creditors than would probably be achieved in an immediate liquidation”.336 It is 
therefore, as submitted by Levenstein,337 regrettable that a board is prohibited from passing a 
resolution to commence business rescue proceedings after liquidation proceedings have already 
commenced, as the board may be in the best position to ascertain whether a company can be 
rescued, but may not do so in such a case even if they are convinced that the company can be 
rescued. 
In terms of section 131(4)(a),338a court may after considering an application order that a 
company be placed under business rescue, if it is satisfied on any of the following three 
grounds:  
• “the company is financially distressed”.339 The meaning of ‘financially distressed’ was 
discussed under paragraph 3.3 above; or 
• “the company has failed to pay over any amount in terms of an obligation under or in 
terms of a public regulation, or contract, with respect to employment-related 
matters”.340 This ground does not exist under voluntary commencement. Public 
regulation has a broad meaning, in terms of section 1,341 ‘public regulation’ means: 
“any national, provincial or local government legislation or subordinate legislation, or 
any licence, tariff, directive or similar authorisation issued by a regulatory authority or 
pursuant to any statutory authority”. Accordingly, Cassim342 submits that “a failure to 
pay income tax deducted from employees or contributions to the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund or to make payments to a medical aid falls within the scope and ambit 
of s 131(4)(a)(ii)” of the 2008 Act. Failure to pay any single amount is too broad as 
technical defaults can be resolved without an ‘affected person’ resorting to business 
                                                             
334       Sharrock (Note 14 above; 279).  
335       Cassim (Note 4 above; 873). 
336       Koen and Another supra para 14.  
337       Levenstein (Note 74 above; 335). 
338       Section 131(4)(a) of the 2008 Act. 
339       Section 131(4)(a)(i) of the 2008 Act.  
340       Section 131(4)(a)(ii) of the 2008 Act.  
341       Section 1 of the 2008 Act.  
342       Cassim (Note 4 above; 874).  
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rescue proceedings.343 This ground, nevertheless, provides an avenue for employees 
and registered trade unions to apply to court when they may not be in possession of 
information pertaining to the company’s financial circumstances;344 or  
• “it is otherwise just and equitable to do so for financial reasons”.345 It is not clear why 
the legislature included this as a ground, because ‘financial reasons’ is already covered 
on the basis that the company is ‘financially distressed’.346  
 
In respect of each of the aforesaid grounds, it is further required that there be “a reasonable 
prospect of rescuing the company”.347 A requirement that also exists under voluntary 
commencement of business rescue and is, therefore, an essential recovery requirement of the 
business rescue regime. Regrettably, the 2008 Act does not define ‘reasonable prospect’ and 
considering the difficulty that was encountered in interpreting ‘reasonable probability’ under 
the 1926 and 1973 Acts,348 the legislator missed a golden opportunity to give meaning to a 
phrase that has otherwise generally plagued our courts in the past. It was, therefore, left to the 
courts349 to interpret the meaning of ‘reasonable prospect’.   
One of the very first judges to substantially grapple with the meaning of ‘reasonable prospect 
of rescuing the company’, was Eloff AJ in Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd supra.  
The acting judge in contrasting the different use in language with section 427(1) of the 1973 
Act, which used the term ‘reasonable probability’ as a yardstick for placing companies under 
judicial management,350 correctly indicated in respect of the recovery requirement that 
“something less is required than that the recovery should be a reasonable probability”.351 
                                                             
343       Ibid.  
344       Delport (Note 207 above; 482(1B). See also Levenstein (Note 74 above; 337).   
345       Section 131(4)(a)(iii) of the 2008 Act.  
346       Delport (Note 207; 428(1C)).  
347       Section 131(4)(a)(iii) of the 2008 Act.  
348  Joubert (Note 185 above; 553). 
349       In Swart v Beagles Run Investments 25 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2011 (5) SA 422 (GNP) para 23-25, the first 
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351       Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd supra para 21.  
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Immediately after emphasising that each case should be considered on its merits, Eloff AJ 
regrettably then ventured further and in considering the meaning of ‘reasonable prospect’, 
outlined the following details about the proposed business rescue plan that needs to be set out 
in an application to satisfy the court that there is “a reasonable prospect of success of the 
company continuing on a solvent basis…”:352  
• the cause of the failure of the company;  
• a remedy for the failure, and one which would have a “reasonable prospect of being 
sustainable”; and   
• “some concrete objectively ascertainable details going beyond mere speculation in the 
case of a trading or prospective trading company”.353 
 
Eloff AJ, had good intention in setting out some sort of guideline that would assist courts in 
determining whether there is a ‘reasonable prospect of rescuing the company’ concerned.  
However, at the time that an application is brought before court the required information is not 
only unavailable but would be unattainable to the applicants in a compulsory application for 
business rescue.354 Unfortunately, this inflexible approach meant that the bar to hurdle the 
recovery requirement was set too high, which appeared to backpedal in the direction of judicial 
management. 355 This unnecessarily stringent approach was followed by certain judges in 
subsequent cases.356  
 
                                                             
352       Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd supra para 24. 
353       Ibid. See also Joubert (Note 185 above; 556 - 557). In respect of the secondary objective of the 2008 Act, 
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v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another, Anglo Irish Bank Corporation Ltd v West City 
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In Employees of Solar Spectrum Trading 83 (Pty) Limited v AFGRI Operations Limited and 
Another, In Re; AFGRI Operations Limited v Solar Spectrum Trading 83 (Pty) Ltd,357 which 
concerned a compulsory business rescue application brought by employees, Kollapen J 
understandably expressed his difficulty in comprehending the factors set out by Eloff JA, 
especially given “the caveat expressed by … [him] that every case must be considered on its 
own merits”.358 Kollapen J went on to state that “while a court must be ultimately satisfied that 
reasonable prospects do exist in the balancing exercise it must have regard to what information 
the affected party who brings the application is able to present given its own position vis-a-vis 
the company”.359 
 
In conclusion, the judge stated that “[w]hat is required is not certainty but a determination on 
the facts and on the evidence presented that the future prospects of rescuing the business appear 
to be reasonable”.360 This more flexible approach was a welcomed change to the rigid approach 
set out in Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd supra. 
In Propspec Investments (Pty) Ltd v Pacific Coast Investments 97 Ltd and Another361 Van der 
Merwe J agreed with Eloff JA in Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd supra, that vague 
and speculative assertions would not pass muster, and that the “applicant should place before 
the court a factual foundation for the existence of a reasonable prospect that the desired object 
can be achieved”.362 However, he expressed the view that Eloff JA placed too high a burden 
on applicants to prove the existence of a ‘reasonable prospect’.363 He correctly stated that it is 
not suitable to set out a “general minimum particulars of what would constitute a reasonable 
prospect…”364 as to do so would be “tantamount to requiring proof of a probability and 
unjustifiably limits the availability of business rescue proceedings”365, which would be 
counterintuitive to the objective contained in section 7(k).366 Van der Merwe J on his 
interpretation of the term ‘reasonable prospect’ created a new test for the recovery 
requirement367 when he stated that “a reasonable prospect means no more than a possibility 
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359       Ibid.  
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361       2013 (1) SA 542 (FB) at para 11.  
362       Prospec Investments (Pty) Ltd supra para 11. 
363       Ibid.  
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365       Ibid. 
366       Section 7(k) of the 2008 Act. 
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that rests on an objectively reasonable ground or grounds”.368 The new test departed from any 
sort of checklist required to prove the recovery requirement and therefore lowered the threshold 
of proof required. 
Finally, the SCA was provided with an opportunity to provide a clear binding interpretation of 
the term ‘reasonable prospect of rescuing the company’ in Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) 
Ltd and Other (SCA) supra.369 As a point of departure, Brand JA for the full concurring bench 
emphasised that the question as to whether there exists ‘a reasonable prospect of rescuing the 
company’ can only be answered with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, which would necessarily involve 
a value judgment.370 He rejected the checklist approach adopted by Eloff AJ in Southern Palace 
Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd supra, by stating that it is “neither practical nor prudent…” to prove 
the existence of a ‘reasonable prospect’.371 Whilst accepting that a ‘reasonable prospect’ 
requires something less stringent than a ‘reasonable probability’, he emphasised that there must 
be more than an arguable possibility, there must be a “prospect based on reasonable grounds”, 
with the emphasis on reasonable rather than prospect.372 In this respect Brand JA agreed with 
Van Der Merwe J in Propspec Investments (Pty) Ltd supra, that speculative suggestions would 
not pass muster and that the “applicant should place before the court a factual foundation for 
the existence of a reasonable prospect that the desired object can be achieved”.373 Therefore, 
the applicant is not required to set out a detailed business rescue plan, that “can be left to the 
business rescue practitioner after a proper investigation in terms of s 141. But the applicant 
must establish grounds for the reasonable prospect of achieving one of the two goals in s 128(1) 
(b)”.374 
If the SCA had decided to adopt the stringent approach set out in Southern Palace Investments 
265 (Pty) Ltd supra, as indicated by Delport,375 it would have “probably sounded the death 
                                                             
368       Prospec Investments (Pty) Ltd supra para 11. 
369       2013 (4) SA 539 (SCA).  
370       Oakdene Sqaure Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others (SCA) supra para 21. Joubert (note 185; 562).   
371       Oakdene Sqaure Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others (SCA) supra para 30.  
372       Oakdene Sqaure Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others (SCA) supra para 29. 
373       Oakdene Sqaure Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others (SCA) supra paras 30-31. 
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Group (Pty) Ltd  v Pellow N.O. and Others (577/2013) [2014] ZASCA 162 (1 October 2014) again 
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knell for business rescue in South Africa and lead to the procedure becoming as ineffective as 
its predecessor, judicial management”. 
If the court decides to grant an order placing a company under business rescue, the court may 
also appoint an interim business rescue practitioner, who meets the requirements of section 
138376 as discussed in paragraph 4.6 below, and who has been nominated by the ‘affected 
persons’ who made the application.377 The interim appointment is subject “to the ratification 
by the holders of a majority of the independent creditors’ voting interests at the first meeting 
of creditors, as contemplated by section 147”378 of the 2008 Act. Once a company is placed 
under business rescue, it is prohibited from adopting a resolution to place itself in liquidation, 
until such time that business rescue proceedings have ended, and the company is required to 
notify all ‘affected persons’ within five days of such order being granted.379  
Alternatively, if a court is not satisfied that it would be appropriate to commence business 
rescue proceedings, in terms of section 131(4)(b)380 the court may in addition to dismissing the 
application, make “any further and appropriate order, including an order placing the company 
under liquidation”. This should deter would-be applicants from abusing the process to avoid 
the inevitable.  
Section 131(7)381 also empowers a court to place a company under business rescue and appoint 
an interim business rescue practitioner as discussed above, “at any time during the course of 
any liquidation proceeding or proceedings to enforce any security against the company”. This 
again reinforces the need to preserve “viable commercial enterprises rather than shutting them 
down by liquidation”.382 
 
4.3  THE COMMENCEMENT AND DURATION OF BUSINESS RESCUE 
PROCEEDINGS  
Provisions relating to when the business rescue proceedings are considered to have commenced 
and the duration of such proceedings are set out in section 132 of the 2008 Act.383   
                                                             
376       Section 138 of the 2008 Act.  
377       Section 131(5) of the 2008 Act.  
378  Section 131(5) of the 2008 Act and section 147 of the 2008 Act.  
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 4.3.1  The time at which business rescue proceedings commence  
Once commenced, the restrictions and consequences alongside the moratorium imposed on 
legal proceedings take effect,384 and as such it is important to ascertain when business rescue 
proceedings actually commence.385  
Business rescue proceedings commence:  
• in respect of voluntary commencement by board resolution, when the company files 
the resolution with the CIPC.386 In the event of the resolution lapsing due to the 
company’s failure to comply with the procedural requirements as set out in paragraph 
4.2.1 above, and the company applies to court for consent to file a further resolution 
within three months, the proceedings will commence when the company applies to 
court to obtain such consent;387 or  
• in respect of compulsory commencement by an ‘affected person’, when an ‘affected 
person’ applies to court to place a company under business rescue.388 This process was 
discussed under paragraph 4.2.4 above. In Taboo Trading 232 (Pty) Ltd v Pro Wreck 
Scrap Metal CC; Joubert v Pro Wreck Scrap Metal CC389 the court held the view that:  
 
A business rescue application is … only to be regarded as having been made 
once the application has been lodged with the Registrar, duly issued, a copy 
thereof served on the Commission, and each affected person has been properly 
notified of the application. 
 
 Delport390 correctly submits that the order commencing business rescue proceedings: 
 
[S]hould be retrospective to the time of the presentation to the Court of 
application. A different interpretation could have the effect that if the business 
rescue commences upon application to Court, and the application is not 
                                                             
384  Cassim (Note 4 above; 876). 
385  Rushworth (Note 229 above; 382).  
386  Section 132(1)(a)(i) of the 2008 Act.  
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successful, the company would have been in business rescue for the interim 
period. 
 ; or 
• when a court, during liquidation proceedings or proceedings to enforce a security 
interest, places a company under supervision.391 
 
4.3.2  Duration of business rescue proceedings  
The UK Insolvency Act 392 provides for the automatic termination of administration at “the end 
of the period of one year” from the date on which it commenced. Provision is also made for 
the extension of time by the court (on application by an administrator) for a specific period or 
by creditors for a period not exceeding one year.393   
In contrast, the 2008 Act does not make provision for the automatic termination of business 
rescue proceedings, instead, it expressly envisages that the business rescue process would 
terminate “within three months after the start of those proceedings”.394 This time period may 
be extended by a court on application by a practitioner.395  
The practitioner is, therefore, within the space of three months “required to hold a meeting of 
various stakeholders, consult on the development of a business rescue plan, hold a meeting to 
decide the future of the company, and implement the business rescue plan if one has been 
approved”.396 It is submitted that the time frame of three months is practically unrealistic, as 
once any component of the business rescue process is challenged, there is virtually no prospect 
of it being completed within three months.397 In the case of Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) 
Ltd and Others supra398 Classen J criticised the time frame of three months as being “totally 
unrealistic in a case such as this where there are numerous court proceedings still pending”.399 
If the business rescue proceedings have not terminated within three months, or within such 
longer time permitted by a court, the practitioner is required to prepare a report on the progress 
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of the business rescue proceedings and update it at the end of each succeeding month, until 
such time that proceedings have terminated.400 The practitioner is further required to deliver 
the report to each ‘affected person’ and the court (if proceedings have been the subject of a 
court order), or the CIPC in any other case.401 However, as highlighted by the court in Resource 
Washing (Pty) Ltd v Zululand Coal Reclaimers Proprietary Limited and Others402 the 2008 
Act is silent on “what the consequences would be if the … [practitioner] fails or refuses to 
apply to court for an extension”.  
 
 4.3.3  Termination of business rescue proceedings   
Section 132(2)403 sets out the instances in which business rescue proceedings come to an end.404 
At the instance of the court, business rescue proceedings are terminated when the court either 
sets aside the company resolution or court order that commenced those proceedings, or where 
the court converts business rescue proceedings to liquidation proceedings.405 As explained by 
the court in Ex Parte Nel N.O. and Others406 the court’s power:  
[T]o undo the rescue process and place a company in liquidation is an essential 
counterweight to address the mischief caused by a company, to its creditors 
particularly, which has no reasonable prospect of being rescued from its financial 
distress but has achieved an undeserved moratorium by a stroke of the company pen in 
passing and filing a s 129(1) resolution. 
At the instance of the business rescue practitioner, business rescue proceedings are terminated 
when the practitioner files a notice of termination with the CIPC.407 This encompasses two 
scenarios. The first, where business rescue proceedings were voluntarily commenced, and the 
practitioner concludes that there are “no longer … reasonable grounds to believe that the 
company is financially distressed…”408, requires the practitioner to file a notice of termination 
with the CIPC.409 Secondly, where the business rescue plan has been rejected and neither the 
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402       (10862/14) [2015] ZAKZPHC 21 (20 March 2015) para 19. See also Delport (Note 207 above; 482(27)). 
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practitioner nor any ‘affected person’ has taken any action set out in section 153(1),410 the 
practitioner must file a notice of termination with the CIPC.411  
The second scenario is, however, also covered by section 132(2)(c)(i)412 which provides that 
business rescue proceedings terminate when the business rescue plan is rejected and “no 
affected person has acted to extend the proceedings…” contemplated by section 153 of the 
2008 Act.413 Accordingly, the second scenario envisaged by section 132(2)(b) and section 
132(2)(c)(i) of the 2008 Act, seek to regulate the same scenario but contradict one another, as 
in terms of the former provision business rescue proceedings are terminated with the filing of 
a notice of termination with CIPC, whilst in terms of the latter provision such proceedings are 
terminated by mere inaction of the ‘affected persons’.414 
Lastly, business rescue proceedings are also terminated when a business rescue plan is adopted 
and the practitioner subsequently files “a notice of substantial implementation of that plan” 
with the CIPC.415    
 
4.4  MORATORIUM AND REGULATION OF THE COMPANY’S PROPERTY 
INTERESTS  
From the moment business rescue proceedings have commenced, the 2008 Act imposes 
significant restrictions on legal proceedings against the company and on the company’s ability 
to dispose of property in its possession. These restrictions on legal proceedings and on the 
company’s property interests are considered below.  
 
 4.4.1 Moratorium on legal proceedings 
An essential consequence of the commencement of business rescue proceedings is that it results 
in a general moratorium on legal proceedings against the company.416  
Section 133(1) of the 2008 Act provides that:   
                                                             
410       Section 153(1) of the 2008 Act.  
411       A Loubser ‘The Business Rescue Proceedings in the Companies Act of 2008: Concerns and Questions 
(Part 2)’ (2010) 4 TSAR 700. See section 153(5) of the 2008 Act.  
412       Section 132(2)(c)(i) of the 2008 Act.  
413       Loubser (Note 410 above; 700).  
414       Ibid. 
415       Section 132(2)(c)(ii) of the 2008 Act.  
416  P.J. Veldhuizen ‘Regulation and control of business-rescue practitioners: is there a suitable legal 
framework’ (2015) 6(4) BTCLQ 28. 
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During business rescue proceedings, no legal proceeding, including enforcement 
action, against the company, or in relation to any property belonging to the company, 
or lawfully in its possession, may be commenced or proceeded with in any forum, 
except—  
(a) with the written consent of the practitioner;  
(b) with the leave of the court and in accordance with any terms the court considers 
suitable. 
The UK Insolvency Act,417 contains a similar moratorium, which applies when a company is 
in administration. As the SCA explained in the case of Murray N.O. and Another v Firstrand 
Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank418 a moratorium within the context of business rescue proceedings:  
[I]s of cardinal importance since it provides the crucial breathing space or a period of 
respite to enable the company to restructure its affairs. This allows the practitioner, in 
conjunction with the creditors and other affected parties, to formulate a business rescue 
plan designed to achieve the purpose of the process. 
This debtor-friendly protection afforded to the company in business rescue, as explained by 
Bradstreet,419 prohibits “a rush by creditors seeking to enforce claims that would not only have 
the potential to deplete what little is left in the company coffers, but would also distract the 
attention of the business’s management team from the rescue at hand”. 
Furthermore, section 133(3)420 which makes specific provision relating to sureties and 
guarantees,421 provides that a guarantee or suretyship undertaking by a company in favour of 
another person, may not be enforced against the company without leave of the court, and on 
such terms that the court considers just and equitable. In distinguishing this provision with the 
general moratorium set out above, the court in the case of Investec Bank Ltd v Bruyns422 stated 
that:  
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65 
 
The business rescue practitioner is not empowered to consent to the enforcement 
against the company of claims based on guarantees and suretyships. Section 133(2), as 
the special provision, would apply to the exclusion of s 133(1) insofar as claims based 
on guarantees and suretyships are concerned. 
The moratorium on legal proceedings is not absolute, and does not apply to the following 
proceedings:423  
• legal proceedings instituted against the company which constitutes a set-off “against 
any claim made by the company in any legal proceeding, irrespective of whether those 
proceedings commenced before or after the business rescue proceedings began”;424  
• “criminal proceedings against the company or any of its directors or officers”;425  
• “proceedings concerning any property or right over which the company exercises the 
powers of a trustee”;426 or  
• “proceedings by a regulatory authority in the execution of its duties after written 
notification to the business rescue practitioner”.427 
 
“If any right to commence proceedings or otherwise assert a claim against a company is subject 
to a time limit…”, such time limit will be suspended during business rescue proceedings.428 
This ensures that claims do not prescribe, where there may be statutory, contractual or other 
limitations on time within which claims are to be brought.429 
 
 4.4.2  Effects on property interests  
Section 134 of the 2008 Act, regulates the disposal of property during business rescue to ensure 
that the interests of both the company and third parties are protected.430 A company is entitled 
during business rescue proceedings to dispose of property, alternatively agree to dispose of 
property, only in:  
• “the ordinary course of its business”;431or  
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424       Section 133(1)(c) of the 2008 Act.  
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• “a bona fide transaction at arm’s length for fair value approved in advance and in 
writing by the practitioner”.432 This has not been elaborated on by the 2008 Act, but as 
indicated by Delport, 433 what is envisaged  “is that the transaction should not be a 
simulated one, that there should not be a questionable relationship between the 
company and the other party to the transaction, and that the purchase price should 
reflect the fair market value of the property being disposed of”; or  
• in a transaction that is undertaken as part of an approved business rescue plan.434 
 
In respect of property that is in the lawful possession of the company, irrespective of whether 
the property is owned by the company, in terms of section 134(1)(c)435 a person is prohibited 
from exercising any right in respect of such property, unless otherwise consented to by the 
business rescue practitioner in writing.436 Such consent may not be unreasonably withheld by 
the practitioner, who must have regard to the purposes of business rescue, the relevant 
circumstances of the company, and the nature of the property in question, together with “the 
rights claimed in respect of it”.437 Accordingly, as pointed out by Delport438 if the company is 
not in lawful possession of the property, where for example such rights were validly cancelled 
in terms of a contract, section 134(1)(c)439 would not apply.  
To protect third parties who have any security or title interest over property which a company 
wishes to dispose of during business rescue proceedings, section 134(3)440 requires the 
company to:  
• obtain the third party’s prior consent, unless the proceeds from the disposal of the 
property would be sufficient to discharge such party’s security or title interest;441  and  
• promptly pay the necessary proceeds from the sale to the third party to discharge the 
company’s indebtedness to such party, or “provide security for the amount of those 
proceeds, to the reasonable satisfaction” of the third party.442  
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4.5  POST-COMMENCEMENT FINANCE  
A crucial component of business rescue alongside the moratorium on legal proceedings, and 
which is also pivotal to a successful rehabilitation of a company is post-commencement 
finance.443 Post-commencement finance is the funding that may be made available to a 
company following the commencement of business rescue proceedings and which would 
enable such company to continue trading. 444 It is this funding, in any given corporate rescue 
regime, that ultimately facilitates the rescue of the company.445 
Ironically, it is often difficult to obtain financing when it is most needed during business rescue 
proceedings, as lenders are understandably concerned “that they may not see a return on their 
investment”.446 Therefore, “[w]ithout statutory provisions conferring preferential claims for 
post-commencement financing …” lenders would not take the risk of financing a company in 
financial distress.447   
The importance of post-commencement finance was recognised by the USA, as in terms of 
section 364 of the US Bankruptcy Code,448 any credit that may be provided to a company after 
the commencement of the rescue or reorganisation process will have priority over claims that 
are unsecured and that were incurred before the rescue process commenced.449 To further 
encourage post-commencement finance the super-priority preference afforded remains in place 
even after the rescue process has failed.450  
Following the US Bankruptcy Code,451 Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act, provides the essential 
statutory mechanism for facilitating post-commencement financing.452 In terms of section 
135(2),453 the company may, during business rescue proceedings obtain financing which is not 
related to employment, and which “may be secured to the lender…” by the company’s 
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Trading 102 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2016 (6) SA 501 (WCC) para 33.  
444       Delport (Note 207 above; 482(46)).  
445       Calitz (Note 2 above; 269). 
446       Calitz (Note 2 above; 269-270). See also Du Preez, W and Pretorious, M “Constraints on decision making 
regarding post-commencement finance in business rescue” (2013) SAJESBM 170.  
447       Delport (Note 207 above; 482(48)). 
448  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as amended, codified in title 11 of the United States Code (US). 
449       Cassim (Note 4 above; 882). 
450       Cassim (Note 4 above; 882-883).  
451  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as amended, codified in title 11 of the United States Code (US). 
452       Calitz (Note 2 above; 270). See also Cassim (Note 4 above; 883). 
453       Section 135(2) of the 2008 Act.  
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unencumbered assets.454 Such post-commencement financing will have preference as a claim 
“in the order in which they were incurred over all unsecured claims against the company”.455 
Provision is also made for employee entitlements, such as “any remuneration, reimbursement 
for expenses or other amount of money relating to employment…”, to the extent that they are 
not paid and become payable by the company to the employee, to be regarded as post-
commencement finance.456  
The ranking of claims arising from post-commencement financing is set out in section 
135(3),457 which provides that such claims are to be paid in the following order:458  
• the practitioner’s remuneration and expenses, which is discussed under paragraph 4.6 
below, together with claims related to the costs of the business rescue proceedings;459  
• unpaid employee entitlements which is regarded as post-commencement finance. These 
claims have super-priority status,460 as they are to be paid before all other post-
commencement financing notwithstanding the fact that they may be secured claims,461 
and are also to be paid before “all unsecured claims against the company”;462  
• all other post-commencement finance not related to employment, ranking in the order 
in which they were incurred;463 and 
• “all unsecured claims against the company”.464 
 
In Merchant West Workings Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd supra465 Kgomo J, surprisingly in 
ranking the order of claims in business rescue proceedings, stated that pre-business rescue 
claims of secured creditors would rank below those creditors that provided post-
                                                             
454       Cassim (Note 4 above; 883). See also Sharrock (Note 14 above; 289).  
455       Section 135(2)(b) read with section 135(3)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
456     Section 135(1) of the 2008 Act. Chapter 6 bestows far more benefits upon employees than they would 
receive under the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, and therefore opens the system up to potential abuse – See 
Delport (Note 207 above; 482 (27)-482(28)).  
457       Section 135(3) of the 2008 Act.  
458       Cassim (Note 4 above; 883-884). See also Calitz (Note 2 above; 271). 
459       Ibid. 
460       Cassim (Note 4 above; 883).  
461       Section 135(3)(a)(i) of the 2008 Act. 
462       Section 135(3(a)(ii) of the 2008 Act. 
463       Calitz (Note 2 above; 271). 
464       Section 135(3)(a)(ii) of the 2008 Act.  
465       Merchant West Workings Capital Solutions (Pty) Ltd supra at para 21. Such ranking was also followed in 
the case of Redpath Mining South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Marsden No and Others (18486/2013) [2013] 
ZAGPJHC 148 (14 June 2013) para 60.  
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commencement financing.466 Delport467 indicates that the dicta of Kgomo J “were clearly 
obiter”, and correctly highlights that Kgomo J did not take cognisance of the fact that section 
135(3)468 does not mention the claims of secured creditors prior to the commencement of 
business rescue proceedings, as they are regulated by section 134(3) of the 2008 Act.  
Another incentive for post-commencement financing is that the preference of claims set out in 
section 135(3)469 remains in force, even “[i]f business rescue proceedings are superseded by a 
liquidation order … except to the extent of any claims arising out of the costs of liquidation”.470  
An important proposed amendment to section 135 of the 2008 Act by the Companies 
Amendment Bill 2018, 471 is that any amounts owing “by a company under business rescue to 
a landlord for rent or services will be regarded as post-commencement financing”.472 If passed 
this would provide much-needed relief to landlords once a company is placed under business 
rescue, especially in the retail sector. Following on from the proposed amendment of section 
135, it is further proposed that section 145 of the 2008 Act be amended to the effect that “the 
landlord will have a voting interest in business rescue proceedings to the extent of its claim”.473  
 
4.6  THE BUSINESS RESCUE PRACTITIONER                                                                                  
Section 128(1)(d) of the 2008 Act defines a ‘business rescue practitioner’ as a person474 (or if 
more than one, persons jointly)475 appointed to oversee a company during business rescue 
proceedings.  
                                                             
466       Calitz (Note 2 above; 271-272).  
467       Delport (Note 207 above; 482(48)).  
468       Section 135(3) of the 2008 Act. 
469       Section 135(3) of the 2008 Act.  
470       Section 135(4) of the 2008 Act.  
471        GN 969 of GG 41913, 21/09/2018; 16-18. The Companies Amendment Bill 2018 was published for public 
comment on 21 September 2018, which comments were required to have been submitted within 60 days 
of publication, by 20 November 2018. 
472       S Kennedy-Good ‘The South African Companies Amendment Bill 2018’ 27 September 2018 available at  
https://www.financialinstitutionslegalsnapshot.com/2018/09/the-south-african-companies-amendment-
bill-2018/ accessed on 20 October 2018.  
473       Ibid.  
474  The definition of a person in section 1 of the 2008 Act, “includes a juristic person” it is therefore possible 
that “a company may be appointed as a business rescue practitioner”- See Delport (Note 207 above;483). 
475  Despite the definition envisaging the appointment of more than one business rescue practitioner, the 
provisions of Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act do not appear to cater for this i.e. there is no provision concerning 
the remuneration of a business rescue practitioner that provides for the distribution of fees if there is more 
than one business rescue practitioner, or if there is a dispute between the practitioners how this is to be 
dealt with – See Delport (Note 207 above; 483).  
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The business rescue practitioner occupies a powerful and pivotal, if not the most pivotal, role 
in the business rescue process.476 The practitioner has wide-ranging powers to supervise and 
manage the affairs of the company,477 as once appointed the practitioner usurps “full 
management control of the company in substitution for its board and pre-existing 
management”.478 This does not mean that the pre-existing management is completely removed, 
it will continue subject to the business rescue practitioner’s authority.479 
This is in contrast to the ‘debtor-in-possession’ position found in the Chapter 11 of the US 
Bankruptcy Code,480 in which as Levenstein481 explains the “debtor company is left in control 
of the business and bankruptcy proceedings except in very limited situations where a trustee 
may be appointed” only for “cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross 
mismanagement”.482 
 
4.6.1 Circumstances under which a business rescue practitioner may be appointed  
A practitioner may be appointed in any one of the following three ways. First, as set out in 
paragraph 4.2.1 above, by the company’s board of directors if business rescue proceedings are 
commenced by way of a board resolution.483 Secondly, as set out in paragraph 4.2.4 above, 
where an application is brought by an ‘affected person’ to place the company under business 
rescue, the court may appoint an interim practitioner, nominated by the ‘affected person’ who 
brought the application.484 The interim appointment is, however, “subject to the ratification by 
the holders of a majority of the independent creditors’485 voting interests at the first meeting of 
                                                             
476  Cassim (Note 4 above; 888). 
477  Rushworth (Note 229 above; 392). See also Levenstein (Note 74 above; 394) and Cassim (Note 4 above; 
889).  
478  Section 140(1)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
479       Cassim (Note 4 above; 894). 
480  Sections 1104(a); 1107 of Chapter 11 of the 1978 US Bankruptcy Code US Bankruptcy Code Act. See P 
Mindlin ‘Comparative Analysis of Chapter 6 of The South African Companies Act, No. 71 OF 2008 
(Business Rescue Proceedings)’ (1 March 2013) Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz available at  
  https://www.thedti.gov.za/business_regulation/presentations/symposium1of6.pdf, accessed on 15 
September 2018.   
481  Levenstein (Note 74 above; 394).  
482  11 U.S.C. section 1104(a). 
483  Cassim (Note 4 above; 889).  
484  Cassim (Note 4 above; 889). 
485  In terms of section 128(g) of the 2008 Act, ‘independent creditor’ is defined as person who:  
(i) is a creditor of the company, including an employee of the company who is a creditor in terms of 
section 144(2); and  
             (ii) is not related to the company, a director, or the practitioner, subject to subsection (2). 
       Section 144(2) of the 2008 Act, provides that:  
To the extent that any remuneration, reimbursement for expenses or other amount of money relating to 
employment became due and payable by a company to an employee at any time before the beginning of 
the company’s business rescue proceedings, and had not been paid to that employee immediately before 
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creditors, as contemplated by section 147”486 of the 2008 Act.  Lastly, when a court sets aside 
an appointment of a practitioner appointed by the company, as a result of a successful objection 
by an ‘affected person’, the court must appoint an alternative practitioner.487 The practitioner 
appointed under these circumstances would be either recommended or acceptable to “the 
holders of a majority of the independent creditors’ voting interests who were represented in the 
hearing before the court”.488  
The fundamental objective of a practitioner is to develop and implement a business rescue plan, 
if approved, to achieve either one of the two objectives of business rescue as outlined in 
paragraph 3.3 above. 
 
4.6.2  The qualifications of a business rescue practitioner 
A business rescue practitioner’s experience, expertise and integrity will determine the fairness 
and efficiency of the business rescue process, and ultimately its success.489 It is therefore 
critical that the practitioner is suitably qualified and experienced in business rescue matters.490 
The practitioner should therefore ideally be a turnaround expert, not a person skilled in 
liquidating businesses.491 
The requisite qualifications are, however, not only restricted to turnaround experts.492 In terms 
of Section 138(1)(a) - (f) of the 2008 Act, a person is only eligible to be appointed as a business 
rescue practitioner to a company if the person:  
• “is a member in good standing of a legal, accounting or business management 
profession accredited” by the CIPC;493  
• “has been licensed as such by the CIPC in terms of” section 138(2)” of the 2008 Act;494 
• “is not subject to an order of probation in terms of section162(7)” of the 2008 Act;495 
                                                             
the beginning of those proceedings, the employee is a preferred unsecured creditor of the company for 
the purposes of this Chapter.  
486  Section 131(5) of the 2008 Act. 
487  Cassim (Note 4 above; 889). See section 130(6)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
488  Section 130 (6)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
489  Bradstreet (Note 32 above; 374). See also Cassim (Note 4 above; 889). 
490  Stein and Everingham (Note 8 above; 425).  
491  Stein and Everingham (Note 8 above; 425). 
492  Cassim (Note 4 above; 890). 
493  Section 138(1)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
494  Section 138(1)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
495  Section 138(1)(c) of the 2008 Act.  
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• “would not be disqualified from acting as a director of the company in terms of section 
69(8)” of the 2008 Act;496 
• “does not have any other relationship with the company such as would lead a reasonable 
and informed third party to conclude that the integrity, impartiality or objectivity of that 
person is compromised by that relationship”;497and  
• “is not related to a person who has a relationship contemplated” by the penultimate 
prerequisite.498 
 
Although the 2008 Act clearly envisaged the appointment of a business rescue practitioner as 
a member of  a “legal, accounting and business management professions” accredited by the 
CIPC,499 the CIPC since the 2008 Act came into effect on 1 May 2011, had been licensing 
practitioners on an individual basis in accordance with section 138(2)  of the 2008 Act, without 
confirming membership to a profession.500  This was as a direct result of the CIPC not 
accrediting any professional bodies. Accordingly, the CIPC had issued licences if it was 
satisfied that the applicant was of good character and integrity, the applicant’s education and 
experience were sufficient to perform the functions of a business rescue practitioner, and was 
not disqualified from appointment in terms of section 138(1)(c) or (d) of the 2008 Act.501 This 
had, unfortunately, created a loophole that diminished the standard and quality of business 
rescue practitioners in practice. The loophole was addressed by the CIPC in 2017 when it issued 
a notice requiring practitioners and aspiring practitioners “to belong to a legal, accounting or 
business management profession recognised by the South African Qualifications Authority”.502  
                                                             
496  Section 138(1)(d) of the 2008 Act.  
497  Section 138(1)(e) of the 2008 Act.  
498  Section 138(1)(f) of the 2008 Act.  
499  Delport (Note 207 above; 484). 
500  R, Voller ‘Notice to Customers (Notice 30 of 2017) Transitional Period of Conditional Licences’ (26 
April 2017) CIPC available at 
https://www.saica.co.za/Portals/0/Technical/LegalAndGovernance/Companies%20Act/Notice_30_of_20
17.pdf accessed on 20 September 2018.  
501  Levenstein (Note 74 above; 624-625). See regulation 126(4) of the 2008 Act.  
502  Voller (Note 500 above). The following professional bodies have been accredited by the CIPC as at march 
2018, Institute of Accounting and Commerce, South African Institute of Professional Accountants, 
Southern African Institute for Business Accountants, South African Institute of Chartered Accountants, 
The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, The Law Society of The Northern Province, The Law 
Society of Kwazulu-Natal, The Cape Law Society, The Law Society of The Free State, The Institute of 
Business Advisors NPC, The Chartered Institute of Management Accountants, Turnaround Management 
Association, and the South African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association NPC  ̶  See R, 
Voller ‘Notice to Customers (Notice 14 of 2018) List of Accredited Professional Bodies whose members 
are eligible to be licensed as business rescue practitioners as at 28 March 2018’ (28 March 2018) CIPC  
available at http://www.cipc.co.za/files/6315/2231/0262/List_of_Accredited_Bodies.pdf , accessed on 20 
September 2018. 
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The Minister is further vested with the power to make regulations that prescribe:  
• the standards and procedures to be adhered to by the CIPC in carrying out its licensing 
powers and functions;503 and  
• the minimum qualifications for a person to be eligible to practice as a practitioner, 
together with the minimum qualifications for varying categories of companies.504  
 
Regulations relating to the ‘Accreditation of professions and licensing of business rescue 
practitioners’,505 ‘Restrictions on practice’,506 and ‘Tariff of fees for business rescue 
practitioners’507 have been set out in the 2008 Act.  
Regulation 127(2)(b) of the 2008 Act, distinguishes between large, medium and small 
companies undergoing business rescue proceedings in accordance with their classification and 
most recent public interest score.508  
 
4.6.3  The removal of the business rescue practitioner   
The 2008 Act is clear, only a court is empowered to remove a business rescue practitioner from 
office, either in terms of section 130509 as set out in paragraph 4.2.3 above, or in terms of section 
139(2).510 In terms of the latter section, a court may on application by an ‘affected person’ or 
of its own volition remove a practitioner on any of the following grounds:511  
• “[i]ncompetence or failure to perform the duties of a business rescue practitioner of the 
particular company”;512  
• “failure to exercise the proper degree of care in the performance of the practitioner’s 
functions”; 513 
                                                             
503  Section 138(3)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
504  Section 138(3)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
505  Regulation 126 of the 2008 Act.  
506  Regulation 127 of the 2008 Act.  
507  Regulations 128 of the 2008 Act.  
508  Cassim (Note 4 above; 890).  
509       Section 130 of the 2008 Act.  
510       Section 139(2) of the 2008 Act.  
511  Delport (Note 207 above; 489).  
512  Section 139(2)(e) of the 2008 Act. 
513  Section 139(2)(b) of the 2008 Act. In terms of section 140(3)(a) of the 2008 Act the business rescue 
practitioner is considered “an officer of the court”, and also has the “responsibilities, duties and liabilities 
of a director” of a company as set out in sections 75 to 77 of the 2008 Act. A court will therefore look at 
all these holistically to ascertain whether the practitioner has exercised the proper degree of care in the 
performing the practitioner’s functions   ̶ See Delport (Note 207 above; 489).  
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• “engaging in illegal acts or conduct”; 514  
• “if the practitioner no longer satisfies the requirements” for appointment as a 
practitioner; 515 
• “conflict of interest or lack of independence”; 516 or  
• “the practitioner is incapacitated and unable to perform the functions of that office, and 
is unlikely to regain that capacity within a reasonable time”.517 
 
If a practitioner dies, resigns or is removed from office, the company or creditors who 
nominated the practitioner is required to appoint a new practitioner.518 This is “subject to the 
right of an affected person to bring a fresh application” to set aside the appointment of the new 
practitioner in terms of section 130(1)(b) of the 2008 Act.519  
 
4.6.4  Remuneration of business rescue practitioners 
The remuneration of a business rescue practitioner is of great importance to the business rescue 
proceedings, as it could impact on the impartiality and independence of a practitioner.520  
A practitioner appointed to a company is entitled to charge an amount to such company for his 
or her remuneration and expenses in accordance with a tariff prescribed by the Minister.521 
Regulation 128522 of the 2008 Act, sets out the tariff of fees for practitioners, which makes 
provision for a “time-based fee coupled with a daily maximum amount that can be charged by 
a business rescue practitioner”.523 The tariff of fees chargeable by a practitioner does not 
depend on the classification of the practitioner i.e. senior, experienced or junior practitioner, 
but whether the company concerned is classified as a small, medium, large or state-owned 
company.524 A practitioner’s fee in respect of a small company is R 1250.00 per hour whilst 
limited to a maximum amount R15 625.00 per day inclusive of VAT,525 R 1500.00 per hour 
                                                             
514  Section 139(2)(c) of the 2008 Act. 
515  Section 139(2)(d) of the 2008 Act. 
516  Section 139(2)(e) of the 2008 Act.  
517  Section 139(2)(f) of the 2008 Act.  
518  Section 139(3) of the 2008 Act.  
519  Section 139(3) of the 2008 Act.  
520   Cassim (Note 4 above; 891). 
521  Section 143(1) and (6) of the 2008 Act. See also Cassim (Note 4 above; 892).  
522  Cassim (Note 4 above; 892).  
523  Delport (Note 207 above; 500(3)). 
524  Cassim (Note 4 above; 892). Regulation 127 of the 2008 Act, differentiates between a large, medium and 
small company based on the type of company and their public interest score – See (Cassim Note 4 above; 
890). Regulation 26(2) of the 2008 Act sets out the process of calculating a company’s public interest 
score.  
525  Regulation 128(1)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
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whilst  limited to a maximum amount of R 18 750.00 per day inclusive of VAT in respect of a 
medium company,526 and R2000.00 per hour whilst limited to a maximum amount of                          
R 25 000.00 per day inclusive of VAT in respect of a large or state-owned company.527 In 
addition to remuneration the practitioner is entitled to be reimbursed for ‘expenses’, which in 
terms of regulation 128(3) of the 2008 Act includes “the actual cost of any disbursement made 
by the practitioner, or expenses incurred by the practitioner to the extent reasonably necessary 
to carry out the practitioner’s functions and facilitate the conduct of the company’s business 
rescue proceedings”.528 
Unfortunately, the 2008 Act makes no provisions for the “taxation of a business rescue 
practitioner’s remuneration, disbursements and expenses”529, to curb any potential abuse by 
practitioners. In Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and others supra530 Classen J stated the 
following: 
There is no provision for the taxation of the fees, costs and expenses of a business rescue 
practitioner, whereas a liquidator’s costs are subject to taxation. There is, therefore, 
independent control over the costs of a liquidation whereas there is currently none in 
the case of a business rescue procedure. This aspect may be for the Legislature to 
consider when further amendments to the Act are proposed. 
Meyer J in Murgatroyd v Van Den Heerver N.O. and Others531 agreed with Delport,532that:  
Considering the rather liberal hourly and maximum daily tariff the practitioner is 
entitled to, it seems unwise not to make provision for the amounts claimed to be 
scrutinised by an independent party in order to ensure that there is no abuse by 
practitioners claiming excessive fees. 
The practitioner is furthermore entitled in terms of section 143(2) of the 2008 Act to propose 
an agreement with the company providing for further remuneration calculated on a contingency 
basis, in addition, to the remuneration contemplated by the tariff, which is related to:  
                                                             
526  Regulation 128(1)(b) of the 2008 Act.   
527  Regulation 128(1)(c) of the 2008 Act.  
528  Regulations 128(3) of the 2008 Act. See also Delport (Note 207 above; 500(3)). See Dotcom Trading 118 
(Pty) Ltd v Hobbs Sinclair Advisory (Pty) Ltd (6532/2014) [2017] ZAWCHC 144 para 25. 
529  Murgatroyd v Van Den Heerver N.O. and Others (20456/2014) [2014] ZAGPJHC 142 para 4. 
530  Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and others supra para 49.  
531  Murtgatroyd supra para 4.  
532  Delport (Note 207 above; 500(3)-500(4)).  
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• “the adoption of a business rescue plan at all, or within a particular time, or the 
inclusion of any particular matter within such a plan”;533 or  
• “the attainment of any particular result or combination of results relating to the 
business rescue proceedings”.534 
 
As a precautionary measure against abuse,535 for a contingency fee agreement to be binding on 
the company it must be approved at a meeting called for the purpose to consider it by:  
• “the holders present and voting of the majority of the independent creditors’ voting 
interests; and 
• the holders present and voting of the majority of the voting rights of shares entitling the 
shareholder to a portion of the residual value of the company on winding-up”.536   
 
As a further precautionary measure, a creditor or shareholder who voted against a proposed 
contingency agreement which was approved, may within ten business days after the date of 
voting on the proposal apply to court to set aside the agreement on the basis that it is unjust and 
inequitable, or the provision for remuneration in the agreement is unreasonable in light of the 
company’s financial circumstances.537 
As a safeguard for the proper administration of the business rescue process, section 143(5),538 
provides that a practitioner’s claim against a company for remuneration and expenses, to the 
extent that they have not been fully paid, will rank in priority before the claim of all unsecured 
and secured creditors. Accordingly, the unpaid remuneration and expenses of a practitioner 
will enjoy ‘super-preference’ over all secured and unsecured claims.539 However, the SCA in 
Diener N.O. v Minister of Justice and Others540 held that section 143(5),541 “whether taken 
individually or in tandem” with 135(4),542 does not create a ‘super-preference’ in liquidation.543  
                                                             
533  Section 143(2)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
534  Section 143(2)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
535  Cassim (Note 4 above; 892). 
536  Sharrock (Note 14 above; 285). See section 143(3)(a) and (b). 
537  Section 143(3) of the 2008 Act.  
538       Section 143(5) of the 2008 Act.  
539  Delport (Note 207 above; 500(5)). 
540  Diener N.O. v Minister of Justice and Others 2018 (1) All SA 317 (SCA) at para 49.  
541       Section 143(5) of the 2008 Act.  
542  Section 135(4) of the 2008 Act provides that: 
If business rescue proceedings are superseded by a liquidation order, the preference conferred in terms 
of this section will remain in force, except to the extent of any claims arising out of the costs of 
liquidation.  
543  Delport (Note 207 above; 500(5)). 
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4.6.5  The duties, powers, and potential liabilities of the business rescue practitioner  
With great power comes great responsibility. As indicated above, the practitioner has wide-
ranging powers to supervise and manage the affairs of the company during business rescue 
proceedings,544 which include taking over the “full management control of the company in 
substitution for its board and pre-existing management”.545 As indicated by the court in 
Booysen v Jonkheer Boerewynmakery (Pty) Ltd and Another,546 “it is … clear that the 
legislature intended that the business rescue practitioner should be more than a nominal 
figurehead responsible for the rehabilitation of the company”. 
The most important duties of the practitioner are to investigate the affairs of the company and 
develop and implement a business rescue plan.547 Once appointed the practitioner has the 
onerous and necessary duty to immediately investigate the “company’s affairs, business, 
property, and financial situation” to ascertain “whether there is any reasonable prospect of the 
company being rescued”.548 Should the practitioner at any time during business rescue 
proceedings conclude that there is no reasonable prospect of rescuing the company, or that the 
company is no longer ‘financially distressed’, the practitioner must take the necessary steps to 
terminate the business rescue proceedings.549 This ensures that the business rescue process is 
not prolonged unnecessarily, and that those cases not suitable for business rescue are weeded 
out.  
In terms of section 140(1)(b) of the 2008 Act, the practitioner is also empowered to delegate 
any power or function “to a person who was part of the board or pre-existing management of 
the company”. This is a practical approach taken by the 2008 Act, as it is realistically 
                                                             
544  Rushworth (Note 229 above; 392). See also Levenstein (Note 74 above; 394) and Cassim (Note 4 above; 
889).  
545  Section 140(1)(a) of the 2008 Act. The UK Insolvency Act of 1986 and Schedule B1 specifically prescribes 
the scope of the administrator’s powers.  
546       2017 (4) SA 51 (WCC) at para 68. See Delport (Note 207 above; 491). 
547       Sharrock (Note 14 above; 284-285). See section 140(d) of the 2008 Act, regarding the practitioner’s duty 
to develop and implement a business rescue plan.  
548     Section 141(1) of the 2008 Act. Once appointed the practitioner must immediately “inform all relevant 
regulatory authorities having authority in respect of the activities of the company” of their appointment to 
the company that has been placed under business rescue proceeding – See section 140(1A) of the 2008 
Act.  
549       Section 141(2) of the 2008 Act. See also Delport (Note 207 above; 495) and Rushworth (Note 229 above; 
394). If during the practitioner’s investigation evidence is uncovered of “voidable transactions or failure 
by the company or any director to perform any material obligation relating to the company” or “reckless 
trading, fraud or other contravention of any law relating to the company” that took place before the 
commencement of business rescue proceedings, the practitioners is required to take the appropriate steps 
to rectify the matter  ̶  See section 141(2)(c) of the 2008 Act.  
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impossible in most cases for a practitioner to single handily manage the entire company.550 
Conversely, the practitioner may remove “from office any person who forms part of the pre-
existing management of the company”.551 In terms of section 137(5),552 a practitioner may 
apply to court to remove a director on the ground that the director:  
• failed to comply with a requirement of Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act;553 or 
• by act or omission, impeded or is impeding either the performance of the practitioner’s 
powers and functions, or the practitioner’s management of the company, or “the 
development or implementation of a business rescue plan”.554  
 
Alongside the practitioner’s duties and responsibilities set out in Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act, the 
practitioner also “has the responsibilities, duties and liabilities of a director of the company, as 
set out in section 75 to 77” of the 2008 Act.555 Accordingly, this should deter practitioner’s 
from neglecting such duties.  
 
4.6.6  Directors duties to co-operate with and assist the business rescue practitioner  
During business rescue proceedings, the directors of the company remain in place, and are 
required to continue exercising their functions as directors of the company, “subject to the 
authority of the business rescue practitioner”.556 To this end, directors are required at all times 
to attend to the practitioner’s requests, and furnish the practitioner with “any information about 
the company’s affairs as may reasonably be required”.557 In addition, directors are also required 
to “exercise any management function within the company in accordance with the express 
instructions or directions of the practitioner, to the extent that it is reasonable to do so”.558 
                                                             
550       Delport (Note 207 above; 491). 
551       Section 140(1)(c) of the 2008 Act. As submitted by Delport, where such person is an employee, there 
should be compliance with the relevant employment-related legislation, i.e. the Labour Relations Act 66 
of 1995 - See Delport (Note 207 above; 492). 
552       Section 137(5) of the 2008 Act.  
553       Section 137(5)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
554       Section 137(5)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
555       Section 140(3)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
556       Section 137(2)(a) of the 2008 Act. 
557       Section 137(3) of the 2008 Act.  
558     Section 137(2)(b) of the 2008 Act. Section 137(2)(d) of the 2008 Act, provides that if a director of the 
company acts in accordance with the practitioner’s instructions during business rescue proceedings, such 
director will be “relieved from the duties of a director as set out in section 76, and liabilities set out in 
section 77, other than section 77 (3)(a), (b) and (c)”.  
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Accordingly, co-operation between the directors of the company and the practitioner is vital to 
a successful rescue of the company.559  
Section 137(4) of the 2008 Act further reiterates the duties of directors to act in accordance 
with the instructions and directions of the practitioner, as it provides that if  “the board, or one 
or more directors of the company, purports to take any action on behalf of the company that 
requires the approval of the practitioner…” such action unless approved by the practitioner 
would be void.  
 
4.7  THE BUSINESS RESCUE PLAN  
In terms of section 150(1),560 the practitioner is required, “after consulting561 the creditors,562 
other affected persons, and the management of the company”, to “prepare a business rescue 
plan for consideration and possible adoption at a meeting held in terms of section 151”.563  
The business rescue plan is ultimately the epicentre of the process around which the rescue of 
the company will develop.564 However, as indicated by Brand JA in Oakdene Square 
Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others (SCA) supra:565 
[T]he development of a plan cannot be a goal in itself. It can only be the means to an 
end. That end, as I see it, must be either to restore the company to a solvent going 
concern, or at least to facilitate a better deal for creditors and shareholders than they 
would secure from a liquidation process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
559       Cassim (Note 4 above; 887). 
560       Section 150(1) of the 2008 Act.  
561  In the case of Scalabrini Centre, Cape Town and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2013 (3) 
SA 531 (WCC) at para 72 the court said that “[a]t a substantive level, consultation entails a genuine 
invitation to give advice and a genuine receipt of that advice”.  
See also Delport (Note 207 above; 519). 
562  This reinforces the fact that in terms of the provisions of Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act, creditors have the 
strongest right to consultation regarding the development of the business rescue plan, which seems 
appropriate as they have the most to lose financially  ̶  See Delport (Note 207 above; 518). 
563       Section 151 of the 2008 Act.   
564  Delport (Note 207 above; 517).  
565  Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others (SCA) supra para 31.  
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 4.7.1  The contents of a business rescue plan 
Section 150(2)566 creates a framework for the development of the business rescue plan.567 It 
requires that the “plan contain all the information reasonably required to facilitate affected 
persons in deciding whether or not to accept or reject the plan”.568 The section also requires 
that the plan be divided into three parts. Part A569 dealing with the background information of 
the company, Part B570 dealing with proposals designed to specifically rescue the company and 
Part C571 dealing with the assumptions and conditions on which the plan is premised.572 Section 
150(2)(a) - (c) of the 2008 Act further prescribes the minimum information that each of the 
three parts should contain.573   
In Absa Bank Limited v Marotex (Pty) Ltd and Others574 the court adopted the view that section 
150(2) of the 2008 Act “serves as guidance to what a plan ought to consist of”, and the 
development of a plan structured around Part A, B and C depends on the “specifics of each 
case”. The court highlighted the fact that it has “emerged through the cases that substantial 
compliance” with the section “is all that is required”.575 
The proposed plan must further be concluded with a certificate of the practitioner stating that 
the “actual information provided appears to be accurate, complete and up to date”576, and that 
                                                             
566       Section 150(2) of the 2008 Act. 
567  E Levenstein and L Barnett ‘Basics of Business Rescue’ Werksmans Attorneys available at 
https://www.werksmans.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Werksmans-Basics-of-Business-Rescue.pdf, 
accessed on 18 August 2018.  
568  Section 150(2) of the 2008 Act.  
569  Section 150(2)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
570  Section 150(2)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
571  Section 150(2)(c) of the 2008 Act.  
572  Delport (Note 207 above; 517). See also Sharrock (Note 14 above; 290) and Cassim (Note 4 above; 897).  
573  Rushworth (Note 229 above; 402). 
574  Absa Bank Limited v Marotex (Pty) Ltd and Others (1046/15) [2016] ZAGPPHC 1190 (28 October 
2016) at para 48. See also CSARS v Beginsel NO & Others 2013 (1) SA 307 (WCC) at para 38 where 
Fourie J made the following comments:  
A perusal of s 150(2) of the Act shows that the legislature has prescribed the content of a proposed 
business rescue plan in general terms. The content can, by its very nature, not be exactly and precisely 
circumscribed since it would differ from case to case, depending on the peculiar circumstances in which 
the distressed company finds itself. It follows, in my view, that upon a proper construction of s 150(2), 
substantial compliance with the requirements of the section will suffice. This would in my view, mean 
that where sufficient information, along the lines envisaged by s 150(2), has been provided to enable 
interested parties to take an informed decision in considering whether a proposed business rescue plan 
should be adopted or rejected, there would have been substantial compliance. 
See also Absa Bank Ltd v Golden Dividend 339 Ltd and Others 2015 (5) SA 272 (GP) at para 44.  
Absa Bank Limited supra at para 48. This is further reiterated by Delport, who states that “[t]he Act 
prescribes the content of the proposed business rescue plain in general terms and as the content can, by 
nature, not be exactly and precisely, substantial compliance with s 150 would suffice”   ̶ See Delport (Note 
207 above; 517). 
576  Section 151(4)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
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the “projections provided are estimates made in good faith on the basis of factual information 
and assumptions as set out in the statement”.577 
 
 4.7.2  Publication of the business rescue plan  
The business rescue practitioner is required to publish578 the proposed business rescue plan 
within a short period of only 25 business days after his or her appointment.579 However, an 
extension of time may be granted by a court on application by the company or allowed by the 
holders of a majority of the creditors’ voting interests.  
The initial time period of 25 business days is quite opportunistic and would likely be difficult 
to achieve,580 especially considering the time frames provided in other legal jurisdictions. In 
terms of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code,581 “the company and its management has an 
exclusive right to propose a reorganisation plan for the first 120 days of the business rescue 
process”.582 In terms of the UK Insolvency Act583 the administrator’s proposal is required to be 
submitted within eight weeks of the commencement of the administration process.584 
 
4.7.3 Consideration and adoption of the business rescue plan  
The consideration of the proposed business rescue plan and the voting on it are crucial phases 
of the business rescue process. It is therefore imperative to examine the relevant provisions of 
the 2008 Act, to ascertain under what circumstances the plan would either be adopted or 
rejected.  
Within ten business days after the proposed business rescue plan has been published, the 
practitioner is obligated to “convene and preside over a meeting of creditors and any other 
holders of a voting interest”, to consider the proposed business rescue plan.585 At least five 
days before the meeting, the practitioner is required to deliver to all ‘affected persons’ a notice 
of the proposed meeting in which the date, time and place of the meeting, the agenda of the 
                                                             
577  Section 151(4)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
578  The publication of the proposed business rescue plan must be in accordance with regulation 125(3) of the 
2008 Act.    
579  Section 150(5) of the 2008 Act.  
580  Delport (Note 207 above; 521).  
581       Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as amended, codified in title 11 of the United States Code (US). 
582  Cassim (Note 4 above; 897). 
583  UK Insolvency Act of 1986 Schedule B1, para 49(5)(b) and para 108.  
584  Cassim (Note 4 above; 897).  
585  Section 151(1) of the 2008 Act.  
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meeting, and a summary of the rights of affected persons to participate in and vote at the 
meeting are set out.586 
At the convened meeting the practitioner is required to:  
• introduce the proposed plan for consideration by creditors and shareholders (if 
applicable);587  
• inform the meeting whether he or she “continues to believe that there is a reasonable 
prospect of the company being rescued”.588 The presentation of the proposed plan by 
the practitioner at the meeting should, in any event, be an indication that the practitioner 
still believes that such prospect continues to exist;589 
• provide the employees’ representatives an opportunity to address the meeting.590 
Employees, in their capacity as such, are not afforded the right to vote on whether to 
accept or reject the plan, and as such the address by the employees’ representatives is 
the only formal opportunity where the employees’ view on the proposed plan can be 
heard;591 
• invite discussion and hold a vote on any motions seeking to amend the plan in a manner 
satisfactory to the practitioner, or to direct the practitioner to adjourn the meeting for 
the plan to be revised for further consideration;592 and 
• “call for a vote for preliminary approval of the proposed plan, as amended if 
applicable”, unless the meeting has been adjourned for the practitioner to revise the 
plan.593  
 
The meeting may, however, in terms of section 151(3) of the 2008 Act be adjourned from time 
to time, until a decision on the company’s future is made i.e. the acceptance or rejection of the 
plan.594 The legislators were clearly cognisant of the fact that the process of discussing, revising 
the plan if need be, and voting can become a long and complicated process.595 
                                                             
586  Section 151(2) of the 2008 Act. Regulations 125(2) of the 2008 Act, sets out how the practitioner is to give 
notice to ‘affected persons’.  
587  Section 152(1)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
588  Section 152(1)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
589  Delport (Note 207 above; 225-226). 
590  Section 152(1)(c) of the 2008 Act.  
591  Delport (Note 207 above; 526). 
592  Section 152(1)(d) of the 2008 Act. See also Sharrock (Note 14 above; 291).  
593  Section 152(1)(e) of the 2008 Act.  
594  Section 151(3) of the 2008 Act.  
595  Delport (Note 207 above; 523). 
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The proposed plan will be approved on a preliminary basis only if “it was supported by the 
holders of more than 75% of the creditors’ voting interests that were voted”596, and “the votes 
in support of the proposed plan included at least 50% of the independent creditor’s voting 
interests, if any, that were voted”.597 Therefore, as explained by Rushworth598 there is a “double 
majority requirement, with particular protection for independent creditors who have to approve 
the plan by at least a simple majority vote if it is to be adopted”. Since it is only creditors’ 
voting interests that were actually voted on that are taken into account, the voting interests of 
creditors that are not present at the meeting or who decide not to vote, are not taken into account 
in ascertaining whether preliminary approval is obtained.599  
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code600 requires that the reorganisation plan “be approved 
by a majority in number and two-thirds in value of each impaired class of creditors who are 
voting”601, and ultimately the court.602 There is no provision in the 2008 Act that requires a 
court to approve a business rescue plan.603 The UK requires that the plan be “approved by a 
majority in value of creditors voting in person or by proxy”.604 It is uncertain whether a 
creditor’s voting interest may be exercised by a proxy in terms of section 152(2) of the 2008 
Act.605 
If the proposed plan is not approved on a preliminary basis, the plan is considered as having 
been rejected.606 If, however, the plan “does not alter the rights of the holders of any class of 
the company’s securities”, the approval on a preliminary basis will transition into a final 
adoption of the plan.607 If it so happens that the proposed plan “does alter the rights of any class 
of holders of the company’s securities”, the practitioner is required to immediately hold a 
meeting of those holders whose rights are affected, and call for a vote by them to approve the 
proposed plan.608 If the majority of the holders of affected rights approve the adoption of the 
                                                             
596  Section 152(2)(a) of the 2008 Act. 
597  Section 152(2)(b) of the 2008 Act.  
598  Rushworth (Note 229 above; 405). 
599  Delport (Note 207 above; 526).  
600       Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as amended, codified in title 11 of the United States Code (US). 
601  Cassim (Note 4 above; 906). 
602  Conradie (Note 189 above; 7). 
603  Cassim (Note 4 above; 908).  
604  Cassim (Note 4 above; 906). 
605  Delport (Note 207 above; 526). 
606  Section 152(3)(a) of the 2008 Act. 
607  Section 152(3)(b) of the 2008 Act. See also Rushworth (Note 229 above; 405).   
608  Section 152(3)(c) of the 2008 Act. See also Sharrock (Note 14 above; 291).  
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plan, the plan is regarded as having been finally adopted, subject to any suspensive conditions 
of the plan.609 However, if they oppose the plan, it is rejected.610   
Where a proposed plan is rejected, it is not the end of the road, as further recourse may be taken 
by the practitioner or any ‘affected person’ in terms of section 153 of the 2008 Act.  
 
4.7.4 The effect of an adopted business rescue plan  
Once the plan is finally adopted it becomes binding not only on the company, but also “on each 
of the creditors of the company and every holder of the company’s securities”, irrespective of 
whether they were present at the meeting, voted for the plan to be adopted, or “in case of 
creditors, had proven their claims against the company”.611 This binding provision is frequently 
referred to as a ‘cramdown’ provision in foreign legal jurisdictions,612 as creditors are forced 
into accepting the plan irrespective of their opposition.613  
A ‘cramdown’ provision is crucial to the implementation of a successful business rescue plan, 
as it ensures that the business rescue process is not halted by disgruntled resisting creditors 
“holding out for better treatment”.614 Surprisingly, unlike Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code and the 2008 Act, no such provision is made in the UK Insolvency Act615 or Enterprise 
Act of 2002.  
To ensure co-operation, the company is required in terms of section 152(5)616 to take all steps 
necessary, under the directions of the practitioner, to attempt to satisfy any contingent 
conditions of the adopted plan and ensure that it is implemented. The practitioner, to the extent 
necessary to implement the adopted plan, is further empowered in accordance with the plan to 
“determine the consideration for, and issue, any authorised securities of the company”617, 
which power overrides sections 38 and 40 of the 2008 Act.618 In the event of the plan being 
approved by shareholders of the company, “the practitioner may amend the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation to authorise, and determine the preferences, rights, limitations 
                                                             
609  Section 152(3)(c)(ii)(aa) of the 2008 Act. See also Sharrock (Note 14 above; 291). 
610  Section 152(3)(c)(ii)(bb) of the 2008 Act.  
611  Section 152(4)(a), (b) and (c). Section 152(4) is, however, subject to section 134(3) of the 2008 Act.  
612  Delport (Note 207 above; 527) 
613  Cassim (Note 4 above; 907).  
614  Cassim (Note 4 above; 907).  
615       UK Insolvency Act of 1986. 
616  Section 152(5) of the 2008 Act.  
617       Section 152(6)(a) of the 2008 Act.  
618       Cassim (Note 4 above; 907). See also Sharrock (Note 14 above; 291) and Rushworth (Note 229 above; 
405) 
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and other terms of, any securities that are not otherwise authorised, but contemplated” in terms 
of the plan, notwithstanding sections 16, 36 or 37 of the 2008 Act.619 
Once the business plan has been ‘substantially implemented’, the practitioner is required to file 
a notice of substantial implementation.620 The term ‘substantially implemented’ is not defined, 
however, as submitted by Delport:621  
[T]he plan will have been substantially implemented once the business rescue 
practitioner has taken all necessary steps to satisfy the conditions on which the business 
rescue plan is contingent, and has completed all his obligations in terms of the 
provisions of both Chapter 6 and the approved business rescue plan. 
 
4.8  CONCLUSION  
Overall, it is evident from the above analysis of the key components that the business rescue 
regime represents a significant improvement on the judicial management system. As 
summarised by Burdette622 the business rescue procedure contains:  
[T]he most important elements of a modern and effective corporate rescue regime. The 
procedure provides for a dual gateway to access the procedure, a moratorium that can 
prevent creditors from undermining a genuine attempt at saving the company, post-
commencement financing to keep the company afloat during the rescue procedure, and 
a cram-down provision that can bind dissenting creditors.  
There is a clear and welcomed attempt to foster a corporate rescue culture, which “encapsulates 
a shift from creditors’ interests to a broader range of interests”.623 The voluntary 
commencement aspect further signifies a transition to a more debtor-friendly approach, making 
it much easier for companies to utilise the process.624 The ease at which companies can 
seamlessly slip into business rescue as a result of voluntary commencement has, however, 
negatively impacted and skewed the success rate which was outlined in chapter one. As 
indicated by Levenstein,625 many companies utilise the voluntary commencement process to 
                                                             
619       Section 152(6)(b) of the 2008 Act. See also Sharrock (Note 14 above; 291).  
620       Section 152(8) of the 2008 Act. 
621       Delport (Note 207 above; 529).   
622       Burdette “Legislative Framework for the Facilitation of Turnarounds” in Harvey (ed) Turnaround 
           Management and Corporate Renewal – a South African Perspective (2011) 140. Cited in Levenstein (Note 
74 above; 582). 
623       Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Other Supra para 12.  
624       Levenstein (Note 74 above; 635).  
625       Levenstein (Note 74 above; 296).  
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obtain a temporary respite from creditors’ claims, when they were never ideal candidates for 
rescue at the outset. Importantly business rescue has seen successes in larger companies where 
much more jobs are at stake, such as in the case of Southgold Exploration and Ellerines.626  
Ultimately, with an appropriately experienced business rescue practitioner at the helm and the 
co-operation of all relevant stakeholders, the key components of the business rescue regime 
create an ideal framework within which the rescue or reorganisation of the company can take 
place.627 This does not mean that the business rescue regime is perfect, there are shortcomings 
which have been identified as a result of critically analysing the key components. These 
shortcomings are addressed in the concluding chapter by way of recommendations, which will 
serve to further enhance the effectiveness of the business rescue regime.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
626       Levenstein (Note 74 above; 636).  
627       Levenstein (Note 74 above; 582).  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is evident from the discussion in chapter two, that judicial management failed to achieve any 
meaningful success as a corporate rescue mechanism, which failure was attributed to the 
reasons set out in paragraph 2.4 above. South Africa desperately required a corporate rescue 
mechanism that would provide a viable alternative to, and ultimately avoid the ‘deleterious 
consequences’628 of liquidation.  
The business rescue regime enacted under Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act, replaced the failed 
judicial management system. A critical analysis of the key components of the business rescue 
regime in chapter four revealed the regime to be an effective corporate rescue mechanism that 
aligns itself with international standards and core features.629  
Although, the business rescue regime is an effective corporate rescue mechanism, the analysis 
in chapter four also revealed that it was not free from imperfection and is susceptible to abuse. 
The following recommendations would serve to address the shortcomings as well as limit the 
potential abuse of the process, ultimately enhancing the business rescue regime:  
• Levenstein630 recommends that it should be compulsory for the “potential (nominee) 
business rescue practitioner”, prior to the commencement of business rescue, to conduct 
“a pre-assessment of the company’s prospects of success in the business rescue 
process” and prepare a report to be disseminated to all relevant stakeholders, which 
would include the board of directors and creditors. It is submitted that this would be 
somewhat similar to the purpose of the report that the court could call for from a 
practitioner when considering an objection to the voluntary commencement of business 
rescue proceedings in terms of section 130(5)(b) of the 2008 Act, and which was 
discussed under paragraph 4.2.3 above. Such pre-assessment report would be 
particularly helpful to directors who are faced with the dilemma of deciding whether to 
vote in favour of a resolution to commence business rescue proceedings and would also 
serve to curb the abuse of the voluntary commencement aspect of the business rescue 
process.   
 
                                                             
628   Koen and Another supra para 14.  
629  Levenstein (Note 223 above).  
630  Levenstein (Note 74 above; 622). 
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• As discussed in paragraph 4.2.4 above, it is regrettable that voluntary commencement 
of business rescue cannot be utilised once liquidation proceedings have already 
commenced, especially in cases where the board is genuinely convinced that the 
company can be rescued. Whilst it is acknowledged that the purpose of such prohibition 
is to “prevent the board thwarting an application to liquidate a company”631, it is 
recommended that in such instances the company should be entitled to bring an 
application in terms of section 131 of the 2008 Act, which application is to be 
accompanied by the pre-assessment report referred to in the previous paragraph.  
 
• In Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra,632 Wallis JA stated that the 
“commendable goals” of the business rescue regime are:  
 
[U]nfortunately being hampered because the statutory provisions governing 
business rescue are not always clearly drafted. Consequently they have given 
rise to confusion as to their meaning and provided ample scope for litigious 
parties to exploit inconsistencies and advance technical arguments aimed at 
stultifying the business rescue process or securing advantages not contemplated 
by its broad purpose. 
 
In this regard the legislature should clarify precisely when compulsory business rescue 
proceedings commence.633 It is submitted in accordance with Delport634 that it 
commences retrospectively to the date when the application is made, only after an order 
is granted placing the company under business rescue, as discussed in paragraph 4.3.1. 
above.  
• Another factor that has also contributed to the uncertainty of provisions causing ample 
litigation is the failure to define certain important terms such as ‘reasonable prospect of 
rescuing the company’, the meaning of which has been a contentious issue and at the 
centre of several judgments as analysed in paragraph 4.2.4 above. In this regard the 
                                                             
631        Sulzer Pumps (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v O & M Engineering CC [2015] JOL 32825 (GP) para 29. See also 
Delport (Note 207 above; 462).  
632       Panamo Properties (Pty) Ltd and Another supra para 1. 
633       Levenstein (Note 74 above; 630).  
634       Delport (Note 207 above; 482(24)). 
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legislature should define the term ‘reasonable prospect of rescuing the company’ in 
section 128 of the 2008 Act.635  
 
• Although the CIPC has eventually accredited professional bodies recognised by the 
South African Qualifications Authority to which business rescue practitioners are to 
belong as set out in paragraph 4.6.2 above, it is recommended that there should be 
standardised examinations and training as pre-requisites for the appointment of 
prospective and existing business rescue practitioners.636 This would ensure that a 
robust minimum standard is set and that all business rescue practitioners are capable of 
performing the task at hand.  
• The analysis of the business rescue practitioner’s remuneration in paragraph 4.6.4 
above, revealed that “[t]here is no provision for the taxation of the fees, costs and 
expenses of a business rescue practitioner… .”637 It is recommended that the business 
rescue practitioner’s fees, costs and expenses must be scrutinised and taxed by an 
independent party to prevent abuse by practitioners claiming additional fees.638  
 
• The obligation on the practitioner to publish the proposed business rescue plan within 
25 days after his or her appointment, is simply too short and an application for the 
extension of time is almost always made.639 As discussed in paragraph 4.7.2 above, in 
terms of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code640 “the company and its management 
has an exclusive right to propose a reorganisation plan for the first 120 days of the 
business rescue process”.641 In terms of the UK Insolvency Act,642 the administrator’s 
proposal is required to be submitted within eight weeks of the commencement of the 
administration process.643 It is recommended in accordance with Levenstein644 that 
different time periods should apply based on the size of the company, and such it is 
                                                             
635    Levenstein (Note 74 above; 629). Loubser recommends that a “reasonable possibility of rescuing the 
company” should be used instead – See A Loubser Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in 
South African Company Law (unpublished LLD thesis, University of South Africa, 2010) 339-340. 
636      M Pretorius, ‘Business Rescue Status Quo Report Final Report’ 30 March 2015 Business Enterprises of 
University of Pretoria, available at 
http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west 1.amazonaws.com/151110Business_Rescue.pdf, accessed on 14 
August 2018.  
637       Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and others supra para 49. 
638       Murgatroyd supra para 4.  
639       Levenstein (Note 74 above; 625 - 626).  
640       Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as amended, codified in title 11 of the United States Code (US). 
641  Cassim (Note 4 above; 897). 
642  UK Insolvency Act of 1986 Schedule B1, para 49(5)(b) and para 108.  
643       Cassim (Note 4 above; 897).  
644       Levensetin (Note 74 above; 626). 
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recommended that the period of 25, 50 and 75 days should apply to small, medium and 
large companies respectively.  
 
• Chapter 6 of the 2008 Act, expressly envisages that the business rescue process would 
terminate “within three months after the start of those proceedings”.645 As discussed in 
paragraph 4.3.2 above and as highlighted by Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and 
Others supra646 the time frame is unrealistic where any component of the business 
rescue process is challenged. In contrast, the UK Insolvency Act 647 provides for the 
automatic termination of administration at “the end of the period of one year” from the 
date on which it commenced. It is recommended that the time period of three months 
be extended to 6 months in respect of medium companies and 9 months in respect of 
large companies.648 
 
Overall it can be concluded that the business rescue regime is an effective corporate rescue 
mechanism, that can take its place on the international stage alongside other leading corporate 
rescue regimes. There is indeed room for improvement as identified by the recommendations 
outlined above, which would serve to further enhance the process. Through the genuine 
cooperation of all relevant stakeholders, the regime should grow from strength to strength. 
Accordingly, although hope springs eternal, it must be emphasised that “business rescue 
proceedings are not for the terminally ill… . Nor are they for the chronically ill”.649 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
645  Section 132(3) of the 2008 Act.  
646       Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others supra para 47.  
647       Insolvency Act of 1986 - See Schedule B1, para 76 Insolvency Act, 1986.  
648       Levenstein (Note 74 above; 626).  
649       Welman v Marcelle Props 193 CC and Another [2012] ZAGPJHC 32 (24 February 2012) para 28. 
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